Notre Dame Law School

NDLScholarship
Journal Articles

Publications

2010

Stare Decisis as Judicial Doctrine
Randy J. Kozel
Notre Dame Law School, rkozel@nd.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/law_faculty_scholarship
Part of the Courts Commons, Jurisprudence Commons, and the Rule of Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Randy J. Kozel, Stare Decisis as Judicial Doctrine, 67 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 411 (2010).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/law_faculty_scholarship/374

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Publications at NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal Articles by
an authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.

Stare Decisis as Judicial Doctrine
Randy J. Kozel*

Abstract
Stare decisis has been called many things, among them "~a principle of
policy," "aseries ofprudentialandpragmaticconsiderations,"andsimply "the
preferred course." Often overlooked is the fact that stare decisis is also a
judicial doctrine, an analyticalsystem used to guide the rules of decisionfor
resolving concrete disputes that come before the courts.
This Article examines stare decisis as appliedby the U.S. Supreme Cour~,
our nation 's highest doctrinalauthority. A review ofthe Court 'sjurisprudence
yields two principallessons about the modern doctrine of stare decisis. First,
the doctrine is comprised largely of malleable factors that carry neither
independent meaning nor predictiveforce. Second, most of the factors that
populate the doctrine are best understood as evincing, either explicitly or
implicitly, a driving concern with the reliance interests that could be upset by
the decision to overrule a given precedent.
When stare decisis is reconceptualized in terms of these reliance
implications, there emerges a blueprintfor doctrinal reform. In short, this
Article suggests that the Courtshould begin by clearingaway the distracting,
indirectproxiesfor reliance that dominate the currentjurisprudence.In their
stead, the Court should construct a new framework that focuses directly,
rigorously, and systematically on the fundamental reliance considerations
themselves. Such an undertaking, it must be acknowledged, will present
significantchallenges. But embracingthose challenges is necessary ifwe hope
to move toward a doctrine of stare decisis that delivers on its longstanding
promise to promote stability, coherence, and the rule of law.

*
Fairfield, Connecticut. For helpfuil comments and conversations, thanks to Richard
Fallon, Aaron Katz, Abigail Kozel, Jeff Pojanowski, Jay Tidmarsh, and Eugene Volokh. For
excellent editing and assistance, thanks to the Washington and Lee Law Review. The views
expressed in this Article are those of the author alone.
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L. Introduction
There is a grand irony about stare decisis. The doctrine, which involves a
court's choice to stand by a precedent notwithstanding suspicions (or worse)
about its wrongness,' enjoys lofty status as the emblem of a stable judiciary.
Indeed, the Supreme Court has lauded stare decisis as possessing "fundamental
1. See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, THE INvisiBLE CoNsTrTUTION 208 (2008) (describing
stare decisis as reflecting "a resolution to stand by [prior] rulings, at least presumptively, in the
face of one's belief that one probably would have decided differently"); see also Planned
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 954 (1992) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part) ("Stare decisis is defined in Black's Law Dictionary as
meaning 'to abide by, or adhere to, decided cases."' (citations omnitted)).
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importance to the rule of law,",2 promoting "the evenhanded, predictable, and
consistent development of legal principles,"0 and contributing to "the actual and
perceived integrity of the judicial process."0
Yet despite its billing, stare decisis has a remarkable tendency to incite
disagreements that contradict the very principles it is supposed to foster. 5 The
Supreme Court's treatment of stare decisis has yielded unusually scathing
dissents lamenting that application of the doctrine is driven by outcome
preferences and that "[p]ower, not reason" is the "currency of [the] Court's
decisionmaking.",6 Troubling though they may be, these charges are hardly
2.
3.

Welch v. Tex. Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 494 (1987).
Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991).
4. Id; see also, e.g., BENJAmiN N. CARDozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL.PROCESS 150
(1921) ("[A] case which one week is decided one way might be decided another waythe next if
it were then heard for the first time. The situation would, however, be intolerable if the weekly
changes in the composition of the court were accompanied by changes in its rulings."); TRIBE,
supra note 1, at 208 (defining stare decisis as "the principle that carefully considered
constitutional interpretations issued by the organs of government should not be revisited absent
circumstances more compelling than a mere change in the identity of the individuals who
authored the interpretations in question"); Daniel A. Farber, The Rule of Law and the Law of
Precedents, 90 MINN. L. REv. 1173, 1179 (2006) ("[Olnly by following the reasoning of
previous decisions can the courts provide guidance for the future, rather than a series of
unconnected outcomes in particular cases.").
5. See Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079,2098-99 (2009) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the majority's treatment of precedent "can only diminish the public's confidence in
the reliability and fairness of our system of justice"); Jill E. Fisch, The Implications of
Transition Theoryfor Stare Decisis, 13 J.CoNTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 93,94 (2003) ("The resulting
uncertainty of application has caused some commentators to argue that the doctrine is politically
charged and subject to easy manipulation.").
6. Payne, 501 U.S. at 844 (Marshall, J., dissenting). For a recent illustration, consider
Justice Breyer's dissent from the bench in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle
School DistrictNo. 1, Nos. 05-908 and 05-9 15 (June 28, 2007). Audio recording: Opinion
Announcement in Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 (June 28, 2007),
availableat http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2006/2006_05_908/opinion, at 32:53 min.
The case, which involved the legality of mechanisms for influencing the racial makeup of public
schools, was decided shortly after the arrival of Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito. In
reading his dissent, Justice Breyer offered an interesting statement that might be taken to suggest
those arrivals had led the Court to reverse course: "It is not often in the law that so few have so
quickly changed so much." Id.; see also, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558,586-87 (2003)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) ("I do not myself believe in rigid adherence to stare decisis in
constitutional cases; but I do believe that we should be consistent rather than manipulative in
invoking the doctrine."); id. at 592 ("To tell the truth, it does not surprise me, and should
surprise no one, that the Court has chosen today to revise the standards of stare decisis set forth
in Casey. It has thereby exposed Casey's extraordinary deference to precedent for the resultoriented expedient that it is."); cf Richard H. Fallon, ConstitutionalPrecedent Viewed Through
the Lens of Hartian PositivistJurisprudence,86 N.C. L. REv. 1107, 1111 (2008) (noting "the
injection of acidly skeptical writing-much of it by political scientists-questioning whether
stare decisis actually matters in Supreme Court decisionmaking").
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surprising. The Court repeatedly has cautioned that stare decisis is a flexible
"tprinciple of policy",7 as opposed to "an inexorable command."0 Moreover, the
catalog of factors that inform the stare decisis inquiry is lengthy and
uncertain-befitting, one supposes, of a doctrine whose core is a fluctuating
"series of prudential and pragmatic considerations. "9 The sheer number of
these considerations, combined with the fact that the Court often selects a few
items from the catalog without explaining how much work is being done by
each, makes it difficult even to find a starting point for thinking critically about
stare decisis as a judicial doctrine.
My primary project in this Article is to isolate the various components of
the Supreme Court's stare decisis jurisprudence and to study their individual
and collective functions. That analysis yields two overarching conclusions.
First, the modem doctrine of stare decisis is essentially indeterminate. The
various factors that drive the doctrine are largely devoid of independent
meaning or predictive force. Fairly or not, this weakness exposes the Court to
0
criticism for appearing results-oriented in its application of stare decisis.'1
The second conclusion is forward-looking, and it provides the groundwork
for transforming staredecisis into something more predictable, meaningful, and
theoretically coherent. Most of the considerations that populate the Court's
current jurisprudence are best understood-or, perhaps, reimagined-as efforts
to gauge the reliance interests that would be affected by the decision to
overrule a given precedent. There is no inherent problem with such a focus.
To the contrary, reliance interests are a critical part of what gives stare decisis
its value; precedents are among the key "materials on which the community
necessarily places its principal reliance in trying to figure out what the 'law'
is."" The trouble is that the litany of stare decisis considerations turns out to

7. Helving v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119 (1940); see also Patterson v. McLean Credit
Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172 (1989) ("Our precedents are not sacrosanct, for we have overruled
prior decisions where the necessity and propriety of doing so has been established.").
8. Payne, 501 U.S. at 828; see also, e.g., Hertz v. Woodman, 218 U.S. 205,212 (1910)
("The rule of stare decisis, though one tending to consistency and uniformity of decision, is not
inflexible. Whether it shall be followed or departed from is a question entirely within the
discretion of the court, which is again called upon to consider a question once decided.").
9. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992); see also Fisch,
supra note 5, at 94 ("Indeed, it is arguably a misnomer to describe stare decisis as a legal
doctrine as well as perhaps misleading to describe precedents in term of obligation.").

10. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, The Seinfeld Hearings,WALL ST. J.,

July

13, 2009, at Al 3

("Unless [the Senators holding a confirmation hearing] can explain how we know which
precedents to follow and which to reverse-apart from liking the results--all pontificating about
'stare decisis' is really about nothing.").
11. RicHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 63 (2003).
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be a set of imperfect, and sometimes inconsistent, proxies for the implicated
reliance effects.
Therein lies the blueprint for doctrinal reform. The initial step toward a
solution is to clear away the distracting proxies. In their stead, the Court should
construct a new framework for rigorous and systematic analysis of the
underlying reliance interests themselves. Ultimately, the output of that reliance
analysis would be weighed against the value of reaching the correct result on
the merits to determine whether stare decisis trumps in a given case.
Generally speaking, reliance interests are already accepted as part of the
Court's stare decisis jurisprudence, which seeks to "protect[] the legitimate
expectations of those who live under the law."'12 Nevertheless, even when the
Court describes notions of reliance as relevant to a given case, it tends to fall
back on abstract pronouncements about the importance of settled expectations.
While this tendency is perfectly understandable given the difficulty of
evaluating reliance effects, it is also deeply flawed. By taking up the challenge
and endeavoring to analyze reliance interests directly, the Court has the
opportunity to reshape stare decisis into a theoretically coherent, intrinsically
3
sound judicial doctrine.'1

12. Hubbard v. United States, 514 U.S. 695, 716 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring in part);
see also, e.g., CARDOZO, supranote 4, at 151 ("There should be greater readiness to abandon an
untenable position when the rule to be discarded may not reasonably be supposed to have
determined the conduct of the litigants."); Victor E. Schwartz et al., TowardNeutral Principles
of Stare Decisis in Tort Law, 58 S.C. L. REv. 317, 321 (2006) ("Requiring courts to ground their
decisions in existing legal principles encourages the public to rely on the judicial system in
shaping personal and business dealings in accordance with fixed rules of law."); Pamela J.
Stephens, The New Retroactivity Doctrine: Equality, Reliance and Stare Decisis, 48 SYRAcuse
L. REv. 1515, 1565 (1998) ("[U]nderlying the doctrine of stare decisis is the principle of
protecting justifiable reliance upon established law.").
13. One note on scope: This Article focuses primarily on the Court's treatment of
constitutional questions as opposed to statutory questions. The Court generally accords
enhanced deference to precedents that involve statutory interpretation, reasoning that it is much
easier for Congress to revise a statute than it is for the country to amend the Constitution. See,
e.g., Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 175 n.1I (1989) ("[C]onsiderations of
stare decisis have added force in statutory cases because Congress may alter what we have done
by amending the statute. In constitutional cases, by contrast, Congress lacks this option, and an
incorrect or outdated precedent may be overturned only by our own reconsideration or by
constitutional amendment."); Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393,406-07 (1932)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("[Iln cases involving the Federal Constitution, where correction
through legislative action is practically impossible, this Court has often overruled its earlier
decisions."). The wisdom of this practice has been considered at length in the academic
literature. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, The Case of the Amorous Defendant: Criticizing
Absolute Stare Decisisfor Statutory Cases, 88 MICH. L. Rev. 2450 (1990).

416

67
61 WA SH. & LEE L. RE V. 411 (2010)
III Jurisprudenceby Proxy

The following sections analyze and evaluate the key "prudential and
pragmatic considerations"'14 that comprise modem stare decisis jurisprudence. I
hope to show that the vast majority of these considerations are best
conceptualized as flawed proxies for the reliance interests implicated by the
decision to overrule a precedent.
A. Logical and Consequential Considerations
1. Soundness
Sometimes the focus of stare decisis gets bound up with resolving a case
on the merits.' 5 For example, the Court might explain its decision to overrule a
6
precedent by asserting that the precedent is "badly reasoned."'1
The Court exhibited this type of approach in the recent Citizens United v.
FederalElection Commission17case, where it reconsidered Austin v. Michigan
8
Chamber of Commerce.'1
In the course of rejecting Austin's holding that
"political speech may be banned based on the speaker's corporate identity,"' 9
20
the Citizens United Court declared that "Austin was not well reasoned.",
Writing in dissent, Justice Stevens seized on the majority's assertion,
responding that "[t]he Court's central argument for why stare decisis ought to
be trumped is that it does not like Austin.",2 1 He elaborated: "The opinion 'was

14. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992).
15. See, e.g., Fisch, supra note 5, at 99 ("Central to the Court's approach, in most cases, is
an evaluation of the quality of the old legal rule.").
16. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (199 1); see also, e.g., Arizona v. Gant, 129 S.
Ct. 1710, 1725 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("Justice Alito insists that the Court must demand
a good reason for abandoning prior precedent. That is true enough, but it seems to me ample
reason that the precedent was badly reasoned and produces erroneous (in this case
unconstitutional) results."); cf Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079, 2089 (2009) ("We think
that the marginal benefits of Jackson .. . are dwarfed by its substantial costs.").
17. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 886 (2010) ("[Sltare decisis does not
compel the continued acceptance of Austin. The Government may regulate corporate political
speech through disclaimer and disclosure requirements, but it may not suppress that speech
altogether.").
18. Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 655 (1990).
19. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 886.
20. Idat912.
21. Id. at 938 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).
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not well reasoned,' our colleagues assert, and it conflicts with First Amendment
22
principles. This, of course, is the Court's merits argument. ,
The exchange in Citizens United highlights an important theoretical
distinction. Justice Stevens' dissent articulates the valuable, yet oft-neglected,
insight that "restating a merits argument with additional vigor does not give it
extra weight in the stare decisis calculus.",2 3 More generally, the question
whether a precedent is correct on the merits is exogenous from whether the
precedent should be reaffirmed on grounds of stare decisis irrespective of its
rightness or wrongness. As Fred Schauer has noted, "[ilf precedent is seen as a
rule directing a decisionmaker to take prior decisions into account, then it
follows that a pure argument from precedent, unlike an argument from
experience, depends only on the results of those decisions, and not on the
validity of the reasons supporting those results."2 4 The flipside is that "[w]hen
the strength of a current conclusion totally stands or falls on arguments for or
against that conclusion, there is no appeal to precedent, even if the same
25
conclusion has been reached in the past.",
Despite being logically problematic, the Court's occasional conflation of
correctness on the merits with deference to precedent seems simple enough to
explain.2 Those concepts often appear in proximity because the Court needs to
talk about stare decisis only where it suspects or concludes that a precedent is
wrong. After all, if the precedent were correct on the merits, the Court would
reaffirm it without regard to stare decisis.27 We might sort matters out by
resolving that whenever the Court suggests it is not constrained to follow
precedents that are "badly reasoned," all it can really mean is that in those
situations, the apparatus of stare decisis becomes engaged and the Court turns
to other considerations to determine whether it should defer. Understood in
22.
23.

Id. at 938-39.
Id.at 9 39.

24.

Frederick Schauer, Precedent,39

STAN. L. REX'.

571, 576 (1987). Professor Schauer

continues: "Only if a rule makes relevant the result of a previous decision regardless of a
decisionmaker's current belief about the correctness of that decision do we have the kind of
argument from precedent routinely made in the law and elsewhere." Id.
25. Id.
26. For an example of the Court properly decoupling the two issues, see Patterson v.
McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 175 n.1I (1989) ("[W]hether or not [the precedent] was
correct as an initial matter, there is no special justification for departing here from the rule of
staredecisis.").
27. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Stare Decisis and the Constitution: An Essay on
ConstitutionalMethodology, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 570, 570 (2001) ("If a court believes a prior
decision to be correct, it can reaffirm that decision on the merits without reference to stare
decisis.'); Fisch, supra note 5, at 97 ("[S~tare decisis is significant only in cases in which the
second court disagrees with the previously-adopted legal rule.").
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this way, the "badly reasoned" inquiry is not a component of stare decisis
doctrine; it is a signal that the doctrine is in play and, in the ultimate balance, a
value the Court weighs against staredecisis considerations in deciding whether
28
to abide by a flawed opinion.
Before accepting this conceptualization, it is worth considering one
potential exception that might enable a precedent's rightness or wrongness to
retain some independent meaning within the stare decisis inquiry. Think of it
as the degrees-of-wrongness theory. The argument begins from the proposition
that not all wrong precedents are created equal . 29 Rather, while some incorrect
precedents are at least debatable, others are flat-out wrong--or, in the lexicon
of the Court, "manifestly erroneous. "30 The degree of a precedent's wrongness
thus becomes an element of the stare decisis inquiry that must be evaluated in
determining whether the precedent should be preserved. 3
The most plausible means of defending this degrees-of-wrongness theory
is to ground it in the reliance interests that are affected by the overruling of a
precedent. When the Court settles a dispute in a certain way, it is natural that
people and institutions affected by the dispute will rely on the Court's decision
in shaping their understandings and behaviors. Years later, if the Court
confronts the same matter only to reach the opposite conclusion, those who
relied on the earlier opinion might find that their efforts have been wasteful or
counterproductive. When the Court is deciding whether to overrule a
precedent, one of the issues it must confront is the extent to which stakeholders
have relied on the precedent in organizing their behaviors and understandings.
That calculus is an integral part of "protect[ing] the legitimate expectations of
32
those who live under the law."

28. See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 920 (2010) (Roberts, C.J.,
concurring) ("When considering whether to reexamine a prior erroneous holding, we must
balance the importance of having constitutional questions decided against the importance of
having them decided right." (emphasis in original)).
29. See Caleb Nelson, Stare Decisis andDemoizstrablyErroneousPrecedents,87 VA. L.
REv. 1, 8 (2001) ("[Wlhen a court says that a past decision is demonstrably erroneous, it is
saying not only that it would have reached a different decision as an original matter, but also
that the prior court went beyond the range of indeterminacy created by the relevant source of
law.",).
30. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 521 (1995); see also CARDozo, supra note 4,
at 158 ("The United States Supreme Court and the highest courts of the several states overrule
their own prior decisions when manifestly erroneous.").
3 1. Cf Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 75 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the
judgment) (noting that in deciding whether to stand by a precedent, "doubt that the new rule is
indeed the 'right' one should surely be weighed in the balance").
32. Hubbard v. United States, 514 U.S. 695, 716 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring in part).
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Degrees-of-wrongness theory accordingly might be justified as reflecting
the critical reliance interests at stake whenever the doctrine of stare decisis is
invoked. The underlying rationale would be that manifestly erroneous
precedents are less likely to command reliance than precedents whose errors are
more debatable. For example, where a "precedent demonstrably conflicts with
the statutory or constitutional provision it purports to interpret, the role of
reliance is significantly diminished, and possibly eliminated."3 3 Stakeholders
will recognize the precedent in question as indefensibly flawed, and they will
refrain from organizing their affairs in dependence on the precedent's staying
power. Instead, they will minimize their dependence on the precedent and
await its inevitable overruling. When the day of reckoning arrives, the
reticence of stakeholders to accept the precedent means the Court can
consummate the overruling with little concern that reliance interests will be
upset.
My trouble with this argument is its assumption of widespread agreement
about what makes a precedent manfestly erroneous as opposed to debatably
erroneous. It seems to me that there is no real hope of forging such a consensus
even among the nine Justices occupying the bench at any given time, let alone
the multitudes of onlookers whose fortunes might somehow be impacted by a
Supreme Court decision. 34 The cases are legion in which the Justices who
comprise the majority and the Justices in dissent each appear to view the
contrary position as not just wrong, but manifestly wrong. And the problem is
exacerbated by the existence of divergent judicial methodologies. If Justice A
is an ardent constitutional originalist whereas Justice B views the Constitution
as a living document that changes dramatically over time, it should come as
little surprise that each Justice will often view the other as having rendered a
manifestly erroneous decision. The same is true of dueling interpretative
philosophies regarding any number of specific constitutional provisions,
ranging from how to perceive the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against
"cruel and unusual" punishments to whether there is such a thing as a
"dormant" aspect to Article I's Commerce Clause or a right to "substantive due
35
process" under the Fourteenth Amendment.

33. Amy Coney Barrett, Stare Decisis andDue Process, 74 U. CoLO. L. REv. 1011, 1062
(2003).
34. Cf. id. at 1062-63 ("[E]ven clear errors sometimes inspire reliance that would be
costly to upset.").
35. See Fisch, supra note 5, at 101 ("The outcome of the case may reflect a variety of
policy, methodological and political choices, but is unlikely to demonstrate that the minority
view is objectively without merit.").
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It is also worth reiterating that my analysis focuses on the application of
staredecisis by the United States Supreme Court. In that Court, cases are often
chosen for inclusion on the docket precisely because they have caused a rift
among lower courts.3 The Justices enjoy the benefit of prior analysis by the
lower courts, as well as briefing and argument from attorneys who tend to be
extremely good.3 At that level, in all but the rarest cases, "[w]hether a
precedent is seen as clearly wrong is often a function of the judge's self38
confidence more than of any objective fact."
That brings us to a related problem with using a precedent's degree of
wrongness as a proxy for the reliance it has commanded. Given the difficulty
in forging any consensus about what makes an opinion manifestly erroneous, it
is neither fair nor sensible to penalize lawyers, litigants, or society at large for
failing to conclude that a precedent was so wrong as to be ripe for overruling.3
The Court itself has made clear that "[o]ur decisions remain binding precedent
until we see fit to reconsider them, regardless of whether subsequent cases have
raised doubts about their continuing vitality.",40 The implication is that
"1reliance upon a square, unabandoned holding of the Supreme Court is always
justifiable reliance," 4 '1regardless of whether that holding seems (to someone or
another) unusually dubious on the merits.
36. See id. ("Few legal issues reach the Supreme Court if their resolution is obvious. The
presence of a circuit split, a virtual prerequisite to a grant of certiorari, indicates disagreement
among federal appellate judges.").
37. Cf Nelson, supra note 29, at 59 ("By the time an issue reaches the United States
Supreme Court, it typically has percolated through a number of lower courts, and the Court's
members therefore have the benefit of seeing how some other judges analyzed it.").
38. Henry Paul Monaghan, Stare Decisis and ConstitutionalAdjudication, 88 CoLUM. L
REV. 723, 762 (1988); see also TIBE, supra note 1, at 208 (noting that adherence to stare
decisis suggests the acknowledgement that "not being the repository of all wisdom, one's views
just might be mistaken"). For a recent example of disagreement over the proper method for
assessing the soundness of a precedent's reasoning, see Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079,
2097 (2009) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens contended:
First, and most central to the Court's decision to overrule Jackson, is its assertion
that Jackson's"reasoning" . . . does not justify continued application of the rule it
created. The balancing test the Court performs, however, depends entirely on its
misunderstanding of Jackson as a rule designed to prevent police badgering, rather
than a rule designed to safeguard a defendant's right to rely on the assistance of
counsel.
1d.
39. Cf Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 823 (2009) ("Police officers are entitled to
rely on existing lower court cases without facing personal liability for their actions. .. . If
judges thus disagree on a constitutional question, it is unfair to subject police to money damages
for picking the losing side of the controversy." (citations omnitted)).
40. Hohn v. United States, 524 U.S. 236, 252-53 (1998).
41. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 321 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurrng in part)
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Finally, even if we grant the possibility of some exceptional situations in
which a precedent's wrongness is so egregious and so widely acknowledged
that no stakeholder would dare rely on it, the solution is not to retain the
"manifestly erroneous" element as part of stare decisis doctrine. In such a
case-as in all cases-it is perfectly appropriate for the Court to consider how
the reliance implications of overruling a precedent would play out. 42 But the
inquiry must be directed at the reliance interests themselves, not the distracting
side-issue of a precedent's degree of wrongness.
There is also a second, albeit weaker, approach for defending the inclusion
of degrees-of-wrongness theory within the doctrine of stare decisis. The
premise would be that manifestly erroneous decisions are uniquely detrimental
in terms of their effect on social welfare. Such an argument might draw on the
rationale of those decisions, on the assumption that there is something
especially pernicious about judicial reasoning that veers too far beyond the
bounds of reasonable interpretation.4 Alternatively, the argument might focus
on the results yielded by the decisions, reflecting the belief that the further a
judicial opinion deviates from the correct interpretation of a constitutional
provision, the more welfare-diluting that opinion is likely to be.
We would be justified in questioning the assumptions underlying both
versions of this argument. It is one thing to accept that wrong interpretations
are less desirable than correct interpretations, but quite another thing to
conclude that, among wrong interpretations, the wrong-er are necessarily more
detrimental to society. In any event, this debate is beside the point. Even if we
accept the underlying assumptions, and regardless of whether the argument is
couched in terms of rationale or results, it fails for the same fuindamental reason
discussed above-the unsustainable nature of any rule that depends on
consistently distinguishing between manifestly erroneous precedents and
debatably erroneous precedents, especially at the Supreme Court level.
2. Workability
In undertaking its stare decisis analysis, the Court accords reduced
deference to precedents that have "deflied] practical workability."44 The
(emphasis in original).
42. Cf. Fisch, supra note 5, at 107 ("[A] court's decision to adhere to a shaky precedent
that people expect to be overruled might frustrate reasonable expectations more than overruling
the precedent.").
43. See generally Nelson, supra note 29.
44. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992); see also, e.g.,
Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079, 2088 (2009) ("[T]he fact that a decision has proved
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question the Justices ask is whether an opinion has proved too difficult to apply
for courts, attorneys, and other stakeholders.
The Court recently dealt with workability in A ltria Group, Inc. v. Good. 5
At issue was the vitality of Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc. ,4 a fractured
decision from 1992 in which a four-Justice plurality held that the federal
Labeling Act preempted certain state-law claims for fraudulent
misrepresentation aimed at cigarette manufacturers.4
In Altria, the Court
reaffirmed Cipollone with a majority now agreeing that Cipollone "represents
'a fair understanding of Congressional purpose."' 4 8
Justice Thomas dissented on behalf of himself and three others.4
Criticizing the majority for its reaffinnance of the Cipollone model, he argued
that Cipollone "has proved unworkable in the lower federal courts and state
courts." 50 He also quoted the district court in the Altria litigation, which
observed that "courts remain divided about what [Cipollone]means and how to
apply it" and that "Cipollone's distinctions, though clear in theory, defy clear
application." 5 '1 Reasoning that "[tlhe Court should not retain an interpretative
test that has proved incapable of implementation," Justice Thomas concluded
52
that Cipollone "should be abandoned for this reason alone." 1
,unworkable' is a traditional ground for overruling it."); Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 306
(2004) (plurality opinion) ("Eighteen years of essentially pointless litigation have persuaded us
that [the applicable precedent] is incapable ofprincipled application."); Seminole Tribe of Fla.
v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 64 (1996) ("Since it was issued, [the applicable precedent] has created
confusion among the lower courts that have sought to understand and apply the deeply fractured
decision."); Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 546-47 (1985) ("We
therefore now reject, as unsound in principle and unworkable in practice, a rule of state
immunity from federal regulation that turns on a judicial appraisal of whether a particular
governmental function is 'integral' or 'traditional."'); Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491
U.S. 164, 173 (1989) ("[Wie do not find [the applicable precedent] to be unworkable or
confusing."). Contra John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130, 139 (2008)
("[The earlier cases lead, at worst, to different interpretations of different, but similarly worded,
statutes; they do not produce 'unworkable' law." (quoting United States v. IBM Corp., 517 U.S.
843, 856 (1996))).
45. Altria Group, Inc. v. Good, 129 S. Ct. 538, 551 (2008).
46. Cipollone v, Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 513-20 (1992).
47. Idat 530-31.
48. Altria, 129 S. Ct. at 547-48.
49. Id. at 551 (Thomas, J. dissenting).
50. Idat 555.
51. Id
52. Id Justice Thomas explained: "We owe far more to the lower courts, which depend
on this Court's guidance, and to litigants, who must conform their actions to the Court's
interpretation of federal law." Id; see also Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 829-30 (1991)
(reasoning that the applicable precedents "have defied consistent application by the lower
courts").
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Our project here is not to debate who had the better of the argument in
Aifria. It is to address the antecedent issue of whether a precedent's
workability deserves to be part of stare decisis doctrine. The answer depends
on whether workability carries any independent significance in determining the
appropriate amount of deference owed to a questionable precedent.
Of course, all else being equal, it is preferable for the Court to choose a
workable rule of decision rather than an unworkable one. Unworkable rules are
clumsy and unpredictable, creating needless costs and diluting the benefits of a
stable society governed by the rule of law."3 But the reason for favoring
workable doctrines is because that is a sensible approach to selecting the rule of
decision to govern an area of law. The choice does not reflect any inherent link
between a precedent's workability and its claim to deference. In fact, stare
decisis as properly understood provides a potential justification for upholding a
precedent even though it has bred confusion and proved cumbersome to apply.
For purposes of stare decisis, saying that a precedent is "unworkable" is
functionally equivalent to saying it is "badly reasoned." These statements
indicate only that a stare decisis inquiry is necessary, not how the inquiry
should play out.
The previous section explained how reliance interests might be invoked to
defend the inclusion of a precedent's wrongness as part of stare decisis
analysis. A similar argument is available with respect to workability:
Precedents that have been easy for lower courts and other stakeholders to
understand and apply are relatively likely to have engendered a great deal of
reliance. This is because when stakeholders see that a given doctrine is
functioning smoothly and efficiently, they are (all else being equal) inclined to
assume that the precedent is a stable component of Supreme Court
jurisprudence.5 They also are willing and able to organize their affairs based
on the assumption that the precedent will remain binding law. 55 By contrast, a
precedent that is a nightmare to understand probably does not generate
significant reliance; onlookers will view the problematic precedent as creating
53. See, e.g., Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U.S. 111, 116 (1965) ("Unless inexorably
commanded by statute, a procedural principle of this importance should not be kept on the
books in the name of stare decisis once it is proved to be unworkable in practice; the
mischievous consequences ...fr~om the perpetuation of an unworkable rule are too great.");
Thomas R. Lee, Stare Decisis in Economic Perspective: An Economic Analysis of the Supreme
Court'sDoctrine of Precedent, 78 N.C. L. Rev. 643, 670 (2000) ("[U]nworkable decisions are
by definition uncertain, so their retention should be expected to require ongoing and inefficient
expenditures on measures aimed at divining their application and effect.").
54. See Lee, supra note 53, at 699-700 ("Adherence to precedent is usually the costminimizing course of action.. .
5 5. Id.
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an unsustainable situation that will, sooner or later, be corrected in a subsequent
decision. 56 Similarly, a precedent that has proven unworkable may generate
minimal reliance because stakeholders are simply unable to predict what results
it will yield.5 Thus, the argument concludes, distinguishing between workable
and unworkable precedents is a valuable part of the stare decisis inquiry.
The central flaw in this argument is its failure to account for reasonable
yet intractable disagreements over whether a precedent really is unworkable.
Such disagreements undermine any claim that reliance interests can be
extrapolated from a precedent's perceived workability. Altria is a case in point.
As noted by the dissenters, numerous lower courts had struggled to understand
and apply Cipollone.58 In Altria, the trial court noted that judges were "divided

about what the decision means and how to apply

it.",59

While the dissenters

viewed these factors as sufficient to justify overruling Cipollone'60 in the end
they were outvoted. Five Justices conceded that Cipollone lacks "theoretical
elegance" but nevertheless found it sound enough to carry the day.6 In the end,
while one could have pointed to a wealth of support for the view that Cipollone
was fundamentally unworkable, hindsight shows that it would have been
foolhardy to rely on the assumption that Cipollone would fall (at least for now).
A similarly evocative illustration comes fr~om Dickerson v. United States,62
where the Court reconsidered Miranda v. Arizona' S63 famous ruling that in
criminal cases, "the prosecution may not use statements ... stemming from
custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of
procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against selfincrimination."64 Rebuffing Congress's attempt to displace Mirandawith an

56. See, e.g., Barrett,supranote 33, at 1062 ("If... a litigant demonstrates that precedent
demonstrably conflicts with the statutory or constitutional provision it purports to interpret, the
role of reliance is significantly diminished, and possibly eliminated."); Tom Hardy, Note, Has
Mighty Casey Struck Out?: Societal Reliance and the Supreme Court'sModern Stare Decisis
Analysis, 34 HAsTINGS CONST. L.Q. 591, 596 (2007) ("[A]n unworkable legal rule is unlikely to
be relied upon.").
57. See Lee, supra note 53, at 669-70 ("But when precedent produces confusion in the
form of unpredictable results, the costs from retaining the 'unworkable' decision generally may
outweigh the uncertainty created by overturning the precedent.").
58. Altria Group, Inc. v. Good, 129 S. Ct. 538, 555 (2008) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
59. Good v. Altria Group, Inc., 436 F. Supp. 2d 132, 142 (D. Me. 2006), vacated, 129 S.
Ct. 538 (2008).
60. Altria, 129 S. Ct. at 555 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
61. Id at 547-48 (majority opinion).
62. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 431 (2000).
63. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,444 (1966).
64. Id
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alternative test for evidentiary admissibility, the Dickerson Court turned to
stare decisis. On the issue of workability, the majority determined that the
Mirandarequirements were easier "for law enforcement officers to conform to,
and for courts to apply in a consistent manner," than Congress's alternative test
Two dissenting Justices disagreed, noting that "[i]t is not
would be.6
that the judicial burden has been eased by the 'bright...
apparent
immediately
line' rules adopted in Miranda. In fact, in the 34 years since Miranda was
decided, this Court has been called upon to decide nearly 60 cases involving a
host of Miranda issues."0 6 The workability of Miranda, it turns out, was
largely in the eye of the beholder.6
The point is not that workability is irrelevant to choosing the appropriate
rule of decision to govern a case. It surely has a role to play. But as opinions
such as Altria and Dickerson demonstrate, there tend to be plausible grounds
for debating whether Supreme Court precedents have proven unworkable. The
existence of those debates makes it impossible to draw definitive conclusions
about the relationship between perceived workability and reliance interests. In
any given case, it might be that stakeholders have continued to rely on a
precedent (like Cipollone or Miranda) notwithstanding doubts about its
workability. Or perhaps they have dialed back their reliance on the hunch that
an overruling is imminent. There is no way to know in the abstract without
investigating the specific facts and circumstances surrounding a precedent.
B. Temporal and DoctrinalConsiderations
Another set of concerns that emerges in stare decisis jurisprudence
involves the effects of time. This category includes evolving factual
65. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 444.
66. Id. at 463 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079,
2097 (2009) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[T1o reach the conclusion that the Jackson rule is
unworkable, the Court reframes the relevant inquiry, asking not whether the Jackson
rule ... has proved easily administrable, but instead whether the Louisiana Supreme Court's
cramped intepreation ... is practically workable."); id. (concluding that the 'answer to that
question, of course, is no"); id. ("When fr-amed more broadly, however, the evidence is
overwhelming that Jackson's simple, bright-line rule has done more to advance effective law
enforcement than to undermine it.").
67. Compare Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U.S. 111, 116 (1965) ("[W]e find the
application of the [governing precedent's] rule as elusive as did the District Court, and ... we
would fall short in our responsibilities if we did not accept this opportunity to take a fresh look
at the problem."), with id. at 134 (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("The Court calls the rule
,unworkable.' But it is not enough to attach that label.... [The truth of the matter is that there
are no cases (not even the three cited) even remotely warranting the conclusion that [the
precedent] is 'unworkable.,").
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assumptions and understandings, the increased (or is it decreased?) claim to
deference that a precedent garners with age, and how the prior overruling of
analogous decisions affects the Court's willingness to stand by a precedent.
Notwithstanding their prominent role in stare decisis cases, these
considerations provide little help in formulating a principled doctrine.
1. Evolving Understandings
A common feature of stare decisis debates is an assessment of the world
now versus the time the precedent was decided. 8 The Court has described the
inquiry as "whether facts have so changed, or come to be seen so differently, as
69
to have robbed the old rule of significant application or justification."
Consider Atkins v. Virginia'70 which overturned Penry v. Lynaugh7 1 and
held that the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against "cruel and unusual"
punishment forbids the execution of persons who are mentally retarded. 72 In
examining whether a punishment is cruel and unusual, the Court historically
has deemed it necessary to examine society's "evolving standards of
decency."0 3 The Court in Atkins-decided in 2002-set out to determine
whether those standards had changed materially since 1989, when Penry was
handed down and the execution of mentally retarded persons was found
constitutionally permissible.7 One of the points highlighted by the Atkins
Court was that in the years following Penry, several states had prohibited the
execution of mentally retarded persons, while no state had enacted legislation to
permit such executions.7 Phrased in terms of Eighth Amendment doctrine, this
68. Cf. Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 412 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) ("The decision of the Court, if, in essence, merely the determination of a fact, is not
entitled ... to that sanction which, under the policy of stare decisis, is accorded to the decision
of a proposition purely of law."). Justice Brandeis noted: "[Niot only may the decision of the
fact have been rendered upon an inadequate presentation of then existing conditions, but the
conditions may have changed meanwhile." Id.
69. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 855 (1991); see also, e.g.,
Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 244 (2006) (opinion of Breyer, J.) ("We cannot find in the
respondents' claims any demonstration that circumstances have changed so radically as to
undermine Buckley's critical factual assumptions.").
70. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002).
71. Penry v. Lynaugji. 492 U.S. 302, 335 (1989).
72. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 307, 321.
73. Idat312.
74. Id. at 307.
75. See id at 316 (stating that the "legislatures that have addressed the issue have voted
overwhelmingly in favor of prohibition").
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development suggested that the critical fact-society's evolving standards of
decency-had shifted in a meaningful way, altering the calculus used to
determine whether such executions are cruel and unusual punishments. The
Court concluded that Penry could not stand.7
A similar phenomenon is visible in cases where the factual context has
stayed the same, but our understanding of the facts has changed. In Illinois
Tool Works Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc.,7 for example, the Court confronted a
claim that a seller illegally tied together two of its products, one of which was
patented.7 Resolving the claim required the Court to consider a pure question
of economics: When a seller receives a patent on a product, does it necessarily
follow that the seller possesses market power?79 The Court previously had
determined that the answer was yes. 80 Since that time, "Congress, the antitrust
enforcement agencies, and most economists have all reached the conclusion
that a patent does not necessarily confer market power upon the patentee.""1 In
Illinois Tool Works, the Court finally rejected its prior position, announcing
that market power would no longer be presumed. 8 2 Instead, "in all cases
involving a tying arrangement, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant has
3
market power in the tying product."0
This type of factual updating is unremarkable. Judges who are asked to
decide a case will invariably take into account the relevant facts. 8 There is no
alternative. Nor, however, is there any reason why this type of inquiry should
be shoehomned into stare decisis analysis. There is little practical difference
between a precedent grounded in faulty reasoning8 ' and one grounded in
outmoded factual assumptions. In both situations, the precedent is wrong on
the merits. In both situations, stare decisis nevertheless might counsel in favor
of preserving the precedent. And in both situations, it is improper to conflate
the precedent's flaws-logical or factual-with whether the precedent should
be preserved on stare decisis grounds notwithstanding its defects.
76.
77.
78.
79.

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id. at 32 1; Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 574 (2005).
111. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 46 (2006).
Id at 32.
Idat 35.
Id.

Id.at 45.
Id. at 46.

Id

See, e.g., W. Barton Leach, Revisionism in the House ofLords: The Bastion ofRigid
Stare Decisis Falls, 80 HARv. L. REv. 797, 803 (1967) ("[W]hen it is obvious that one's
previous actions turned out badly, or that circumstances are essentially different, the intelligent
human being reviews the problem anew.. .
85. Supra Part II.A. 1.
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Still, the Court has included the factual backdrop among the canons of
available stare decisis considerations, which makes it necessary to ask whether
there is a coherent theory for linking that factor with the appropriate level of
deference to precedent. in trying to formulate such a theory, we again come to
an argument from reliance interests. The extent of reliance on a Supreme Court
decision, the argument goes, derives in part from the integrity of the decision's
factual assumptions. When those assumptions have changed significantly,
there will be less reliance on the precedent by stakeholders, who will expect the
Court to update-which is to say, overrule-the decision in light of new
circumstances.
But determining whether facts and assumptions have markedly evolved is
not always so easy. To illustrate, return to Illinois Tool Works. The evolving
fact in that case had to do with assumptions about the market power generated
86
Disproving that proposition is not quite as
from owning a patent.
straightforward as, say, refutting the "Ptolemaic view that Earth was the center
of the solar system."07 In the latter situation, the incorrect factual assumption is
clear and widely understood. Can we speak in similarly definitive terms about
the market power conferred by a patent-or, to return to Atkins and Penry,
about the evolution of society's standards of decency as they relate to the
execution of mentally retarded persons?
For a similar example, consider the Court's treatment of one of the
twentieth century's most infamous opinions, Lochner v. New York. 8 Lochner,
of course, held that a law limiting how many hours bakery employees could
work violated the Fourteenth Amendment by "interfer[ing] with the right of
contract between the employer and employees concerning the number of hours
in which the latter may labor."0 9 The Court's holding reflected its broader view
about how the liberty of contract restricted governmental authority to legislate
on economic matters.9 0 That approach was abandoned in 1937 by West Coast
Hotel Co. v. Parrish,9' where the Court upheld a minimum wage law and
embarked upon a new era of construing the liberty of contract far more
narrowly. 92 According to the Court's later explanation in PlannedParenthood
of SoutheasternPennsylvaniav. Casey,93 the jurisprudential shift from Lochner
86.

87.

111.Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 31 (2006).
LAuRENCE H. TRIBE, 1 AMERICAN CoNsrrruTioNAL LAW 236 (3d ed. 2000).
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905).

88.
89. Id. at 53.
90. Id. at 64.
91.

W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 400 (1937).

92. Idat39 7.
93.

Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 898 (1992).
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to West Coast Hotel owed to evolving facts and understandings: "[T]he lesson
that seemed unmistakable to most people by 1937 [was] that the interpretation
of contractual freedom protected in [cases following Lochner] rested on
fundamentally false factual assumptions about the capacity of a relatively
4
unregulated market to satisfy minimal levels of human welfare."0
Now, West CoastHotel clearly viewed something differently than Lochner
did. And West CoastHotel did cite "recent economic experience" as justifying
the Court's new approach.9 But is it really convincing to assert that the shift
out of the Lochner era was predicated upon an issue as complex, debatable, and
fuindamentally unlegal as the plusses and minuses of "relatively unregulated
market[s]",? 96 More to the point for our purposes, can it plausibly be argued
that stakeholders in the 1930s should have updated their economic
understandings and ceased relying on Lochner in the years leading up to West
Coast Hotel due to prevailing winds of political and economic theory? I think
the answer must be no.
This all goes to show why evolving factual assumptions, though relevant
to how a case should be decided on the merits, are inapposite to the reliance
interests that underlie the distinct issue of staredecisis. If the Court confronts a
precedent like Lochner, and if it determines that the factual underpinnings of
that precedent have changed in an important way, then by all means it should
take the change into account when deciding upon the proper rule of decision.
94. Id. at 861-62 ("[Tlhe clear demonstration that the facts of economic life were
different from those previously assumed warranted the repudiation of the old law."); cf id. at
862-63 (taking a similar approach to Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), which was
overruled by Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)); Burnet v. Coronado Oil &
Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 412 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("[Tihe judgment of the Court in
the earlier decision may have been influenced by prevailing views as to economic or social
policy which have since been abandoned.").
95. West Coast Hotel, 300 U.S. at 399.
96. Casey, 505 U.S. at 862; see also id. at 960-61 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the
recognized its error in [West
judgment in part and dissenting in part) ("When the Court. ...
Coast Hotel], it did not engage in the post hoc rationalization that the joint opinion attributes to
it today; it did not state that Lochner [was] based on an economic view that had fallen into
disfavor. .. ."). Chief Justice Rehnquist continued:
Nor is it the case that the people of this Nation only discovered the dangers of
extreme laissez-faire economics because of the Depression. State laws regulating
maximum hours and minimum wages were in existence well before that time [and
were based on the belief that] "freedom of contract" did not protect the welfare of
workers, demonstrating that that belief manifested itself more than a generation
before the Great Depression. Whether "most people" had come to share it in the
hard times of the 1930s is, insofar as anything the joint opinion advances, entirely
speculative.
Id.
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That is where the role of factual underpinnings begins, and that is where it
ends. Once the Court has determined that the governing precedent is flawed,
the underlying factual assumptions provide neither a reason for reaffirming nor
a reason for overruling. The resolution of that issue-which is the province of
stare decisis-must be driven by something else.
2. Antiquity
The Court sometimes instructs that older opinions are entitled to more
deference than newer ones.9 Interestingly enough, it occasionally takes the
opposite position, explaining that recent opinions receive the greatest
deference.9 This ambivalence itself is enough to raise doubts about whether a
precedent's antiquity can help to predict whether it will be upheld.
Nevertheless, it is worth taking a moment to explore the underlying theories
that these two divergent practices seem to reflect.
On the side of enhanced stare decisis effect for recent precedents, one
potential justification is that reversing course too quickly could harm the
Court's legitimacy. 99 As discussed in greater detail below, this sort of rationale
is problematic in several respects. Most notably for present purposes, there is
no reason to believe that the Court's legitimacy is in greater danger when
97. See, e.g., Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079,2089 (2009) ("[T]he opinion is only
two decades old, and eliminating it would not upset expectations."); United States v. Morrison,
529 U.S. 598, 622 (2000); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957,965 (199 1) (opinion of Scalia,
J.).
98. Compare Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2098 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[A]ithough the Court
acknowledges 'antiquity' is a factor that counsels in favor of retaining precedent, it concludes
that the fact Jackson is 'only two decades old' cuts 'in favor of abandoning' the rule it
established."), and id. ("I would have thought that the 23-year existence of a simple bright-line
rule would be a factor that cuts in the other direction."), with id. at 2093 (Alito, J., concurring)
("The dissent ...invokes Jackson's antiquity, stating that 'the 23-year existence of a simple
bright-line rule' should weigh in favor of its retention.... But in [Arizona v. Gant], the Court
had no compunction about casting aside a 28-year-old bright-line rule." (citing Arizona v. Gant,
129 S. Ct. 1710 (2009))), and id. ("I can only assume that the dissent thinks that our
constitutional precedents are like certain wines, which are most treasured when they are neither
too young, nor too old. . . ."); see also generally Fisch, supra note 5, at 104 n.42.
99. See, e.g., Philip P. Frickey, Stare Decisis in ConstitutionalCases: Reconsidering

National League of Cities, 2

CONST. COMMENT

123, 140 (1985) (arguing that overruling an

eight-year-old precedent "might make the Court appear particularly arbitrary" and stating that
"[t]he usual concern about overruling a recent precedent is that it may have fallen victim simply
to a change in personnel rather than reasoned reconsideration"). Contra South Carolina v.
Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 824 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("It has been argued that we should
not overrule so recent a decision .... I doubt that overruling Booth will so shake the citizenry's
faith in the Court.").
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it overrules a recent precedent than when it refuses to overrule a flawed
00
precedent in an explicit effort to enhance its own public standing.'
To justify the opposite presumption-that long-standing precedents are
entitled to the most deference-the best argument draws on the concept of
reliance. The idea would be that the length of time an opinion has been on
the books is correlated (positively) with the amount of reliance it has
engendered, for the simple reason that stakeholders have had more time to
understand the opinion, embrace it as governing law, and shape their conduct
accordingly.1'0
Recent opinions, by comparison, deserve relatively little
deference because they are less likely to have generated significant reliance,
giving the Court the opportunity to set matters straight before too much water
is under the bridge. As Justice Scalia has put it, "[tlhe freshness of error not
only deprives [a precedent] of the respect to which long-established practice
is entitled, but also counsels that the opportunity of correction be seized at
once, before state and federal laws and practices have been adjusted to
it.,,' 02

embody

But while the two concepts may be linked in some cases, antiquity has
no necessary bearing on reliance. Reliance implications depend on a host of
factors that may or may not align with a precedent's antiquity. A hundredyear-old decision interpreting the Constitution's Emoluments Clause, 0 3 for
example, might not have garnered any appreciable reliance because few
Americans have had occasion to rely on the Court's treatment of that
provision. Yet a much more recent opinion involving the taxability of
income earned on municipal bonds'04 might have engendered widespread
reliance despite its youth as sensitive investors quickly modified their
behavior in response. Antiquity itself tells us nothing.

100. See Fallon, supra note 6, at 1150 ("As the Lochner era illustrates, for the Supreme
Court to fail to renounce a sufficiently reviled decision could itself have devastating
consequences for its perceived legitimacy."); see also Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876,
921 (2010) (Roberts, C.J., concurring) ("[I]n the unusual circumstance when fidelity to any
particular precedent does more to damage this constitutional ideal [of the rule of law] than to
advance it, we must be more willing to depart from that precedent.").
101. See, e.g., Gathers, 490 U.S. at 824 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[T]he respect accorded
prior decisions increases ... with their antiquity, as the society adjusts itself to their existence,
and the surrounding law becomes premised on their validity.").
102. Id.
103. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 6, cl. 2 ("No Senator or Representative shall, during the Time for
which he was elected, be appointed to any civil Office under the Authority of the United States,
which shall have been created, or the Emoluments whereof shall have been encreased during
such time.

104.

. . .")

Dep't of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 5 53 U.S. 328, 128 S. Ct. 1801, 1804 (2008).
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The Court adopts a similar approach in dealing with a precedent's track
record of reaffirmance. In the words of one recent opinion, deference to
precedent is particularly important where a rule of decision "has become settled
through~ iteration and reiteration over a long period of time."10 5 Wermight posit
two explanations for this rule. First, opinions that have been reconsidered and
reaffirmed are more likely to be correct on the merits; reviewing the issue on
multiple occasions reduces the risk of an erroneous result. Such a theory, I
have argued above, cannot serve as a component of stare decisis doctrine,
which must operate independently of merits considerations to carry any real
meaning.
The second explanation revolves around reliance. One might argue that
reaffirmance of a precedent leads to enhanced reliance, reflecting a popular
belief that the Court is less likely to reverse a decision it has embraced on
multiple occasions. By that logic, an opinion like Marbury v. Madison"06
deserves significant stare decisis effect in part because its continual
reaffirmance has left stakeholders without any reason to doubt its vitality, and
thus without any reason to scale back their reliance.
This argument, though, ends up unraveling. At least in some cases, the
converse inference turns out to be just as plausible. A precedent may have
drawn the Court's continued attention precisely because some Justices harbor
doubts about it. Take, for example, Booth v. Maryland,'0 7 which held that
during the sentencing phase of a capital murder trial, the Eighth Amendment
"prohibit[ed] a jury from considering a 'victim impact statement"' that
"describe[d] the effect of the crime on the victim and his family." 08 Booth was
reaffirmed and extended two years later in South Carolinav. Gathers.'0 9 Given
the reaffirmance, one might have expected that reliance on Booth and Gathers
would have been justifiable going forward. And yet both opinions were soon
0
reversed, over Justice Marshall's powerful dissent, in Payne v. Tennessee."I
105. Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 244 (2006) (opinion of Breyer, J.); see also, e.g.,
Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443-44 ("If anything, our subsequent cases have
reduced the impact of the Miranda rule on legitimate law enforcement while reaffirming the
decision's core ruling that unwarned statements may not be used as evidence in the
prosecution's case in chief."); Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 84 (1938) (Butler, J.,
dissenting) ("The doctrine of [Swi/ vTyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842)] has been followed by
this Court in an unbroken line of decisions. So far as appears, it was not questioned until more
than 50 years later, and then by a single judge.").
106. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177-78 (1803).
107. Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 498 (1987).
108. Id.
109. South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 810-11 (1989).
110. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 825 (1991).
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To be sure, the reversal in Payne followed certain personnel changes on the
Court; the majority included two Justices who were not around for Booth and
one who was not around for Gathers."'1 Nevertheless, the example underscores
that reliance implications are complex and multivalent, requiring evaluation on
a case-by-case basis rather than adherence to inflexible heuristics. Returning to
our previous example, it is more fruitful to think about the profound disruption
that overruling a case like Marbury would create for our societal and
governmental structure than it is to draw lessons from the fact that Marbury has
been reaffirmed five, or fifty, or five hundred times.
3. Remnants and Anachronisms
Another intriguing subset of precedents are those that have escaped
overruling for themselves but that belong to disfavored lines of cases-in the
parlance of the Court, precedents whose "underpinnings" have been "eroded"
by subsequent decisions.' 12 When a precedent falls into this category, the Court
is more inclined to treat it as an anachronism that should be overturned."' The
Court has framed the inquiry as "whether related principles of law have so far
developed as to have left the old rule no more than a remnant of abandoned
doctrine." ,114
Recall Illinois Tool Works, where the Court noted that the "presumption of
market power in a patented product," formerly accepted in the field of
111. See id at 850 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("It takes little detective work to discern just
what has changed since this Court decided Booth and Gathers: this Court's own personnel.").
112. See United States v. Gaudin, 5 15 U.S. 506, 521 (1995) ("And we think stare decisis
cannot possibly be controlling when ... the decision in question has been proven manifestly
erroneous, and its underpinnings eroded, by subsequent decisions of this Court.").
113. See Fisch, supra note 5, at 96 ("Over a series of decisions, a precedent that is never
formally overruled may lose much of its force through incremental judicial decisionmaking.").
114. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 855 (1992); see also, e.g., 14
Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456, 1469 n.8 (2009) (noting that if the majority were to
adopt the dissent's broader reading of a precedent involving the construction of arbitration
agreements, "given the developments of this Court's arbitration jurisprudence in the intervening
years. ...[the precedent] would appear to be a strong candidate for overruling"); Randall v.
Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 244 (2006) (opinion of Breyer, J.) ("Subsequent case law has not made
Buckley a legal anomaly or otherwise undermined its basic legal principles."); Gaudin, 515 U.S.
at 520 ("But the reasoning of Sinclairhas already been repudiated in a number of respects.");
Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 173 (1989) ("In cases where statutory
precedents have been overruled, the primary reason for the Court's shift in position has been the
intervening development of the law, through either the growth of judicial doctrine or further
action taken by Congress."), supersededby statute, Civil Rights Act of 199 1, Pub. L. No. 102166, 105 Stat. 1071.
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intellectual property, had since been rejected."15 The Court deemed it
appropriate to consider whether the presumption should likewise be rejected "as
a matter of antitrust law."" 6 Recognizing that "the patent misuse doctrine"
within the universe of intellectual property had "provided the basis for the
market power presumption" in antitrust, the Court concluded that it would be
"1anomalous to preserve the presumption" in the antitrust context "after
7
Congress has eliminated its foundation."''1
A similar illustration comes from Lawrence v. Texas," 8 dealing with the
constitutionality of a state statute "making it a crime for two persons of the
same gender to engage in certain intimate sexual conduct." 1 9 The Court
previously held that such laws were valid in Bowers v. Hardwick.120 Some
seventeen years later, the Court revisited the issue in Lawrence and reached the
2
opposite conclusion.'1'
Explaining its reversal of course, the Lawrence Court relied in part on a
recent case involving a state's treatment of homosexuality in a different
context.122 That case was Romer v. Evans,123 where a divided Court invalidated
an amendment to the Colorado Constitution that "prohibit[ed] all legislative,
executive, or judicial action at any level of state or local government designed
to protect .. . homosexual persons."'124 In Lawrence, the Court explained how
Romer invalidated state action that was "born of animosity toward the class of
persons affected."125 While Romer was not facially inconsistent with the
Court's prior upholding of laws that criminalized intimate conduct between
persons of the same gender, its broader principles were deemed to have
undercut that precedent.
The Lawrence Court also invoked a second intervening precedent as
eroding the "foundations" of Bowers:126 PlannedParenthoodof Southeastern
115. 111. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 31 (2006).
116. See id. ("The question presented to us today is whether the presumption of market
power in a patented product should survive as a matter of antitrust law despite its demise in
patent law.").
117. Id. at 42.
118. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578-79 (2003).
119. Id. at 562.
120. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190-96 (1986).
121. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 579.
122. Id. at 574.
123. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 623 (1996).
124. Id. at 624.
125. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003) (quoting Romer, 517 U.S. at 634).
126. Idat 576.
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Pennsylvania v. Casey, which upheld the core holding of Roe v. Wade127 that
there is a constitutional right to nontherapeutic abortion in certain
circumstances. 128 According to the Lawrence Court, Casey "reaffirmed the
substantive force of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause"129 and
"confirmed that our laws and tradition afford constitutional protection to
personal decisions relating to marrage, procreation, contraception, family
relationships, child rearing, and education"'13P-protection that extends to the
decision to enter into a consensual, intimate relationship with someone of the
3
same gender.' '
Ultimately, the Lawrence Court concluded that Bowers was so misguided
as to have been wrong even "when it was decided."' 32 For purposes of stare
decisis, that statement is less illuminating than the Court's invocation of Romer
and Casey. In the Court's view, by the time Lawrence came up for decision,
the jurisprudential vision underlying Bowers had become outmoded due to
developments in related areas.13 3 While Bowers technically had remained good
law, stare decisis did not pose any real obstacle to its overruling. 134 The
opinion was dismissed as a remnant of discredited ways of thinking about the
35

Constitution.1

Cases like Lawrence and Illinois Tool Works provide vivid illustrations of
the "remnant" factor in action. Still, they do not adequately explain why
reduced deference is appropriate as a matter of theory. In searching for such an
explanation, we are left to our own devices. The two most plausible
justifications involve the precedent's wrongness on the merits and the effects of
overruling the precedent on reliance interests.
To begin with the merits: One theory for overruling a remnant of
abandoned doctrine is that abandoned lines of cases reflect incorrect
interpretations of the law.' 36 Any lingering vestiges survive not because they
127. Roe vWade, 410 U.S. 113. 154 (1973).
128. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992).
129. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573.
130. See id. at 574 ("Persons in a homosexual relationship may seek autonomy for these
purposes, just as heterosexual persons do.").
131. IdatS573 n.74.
132. Id. at 578.
133. Idat 576-77.

134.

Id.

135. Id.
136. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, Abrogating Stare Decisis by Statute: May Congress
Remove the PrecedentalEffect ofRoe and Casey?, 109 YALE L.J. 1535, 1560 (2000) ("The fact
that Roe's doctrinal legs have been cut from underneath it clearly affects what judicial doctrine
should be, suggesting that the Court should reconsider Roe and that a major chunk of the stare
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are correct, but rather because the Court has not yet gotten around to discarding
them.13 7 That being so, the theory is that the Court should overrule remnants at
its earliest opportunity.
As we have seen, this sort of argument lacks traction because conflating
wrongness with stare decisis tells us nothing about whether the Court should
stand by a precedent notwithstanding doubts about its merits.138 Even putting
that problem aside, there is another objection to using the remnant factor as
yielding definitive conclusions about a precedent's correctness: At least in
some cases, it seems equally reasonable to assume that there is a good reason
why a precedent has persisted even though related cases have fallen-for
example, because the surviving precedent is correct on the specific issue it
addresses.
An interesting case study involves state taxation of out-of-state or
interstate activities. In Quill Corp. v. North Dakota,139 the Court evaluated a
North Dakota law that required out-of-state retailers to collect and remit taxes
on goods destined for use in North Dakota.140 The Court had invalidated a
similar statute twenty-five years earlier in National Bellas Hess, Inc. v.
Department of Revenue,14 1 holding that the statute "violated the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and created an unconstitutional burden
on interstate commerce."142 In Quill, the Court overruled itself on the due
process question and renounced Bellas Hess's rule.'143 According to the Court,
"[o]ur due process jurisprudence has evolved substantially in the 25 years since
Bellas Hess," and "we have abandoned more formalistic tests that focused on a
defendant's 'presence' within a State in favor of a more flexible inquiry into
whether a defendant's contacts with the forum made it reasonable .. . to require
it to defend the suit in that State."'"4 It concluded that "to the extent that our
decisions have indicated that the Due Process Clause requires physical presence

decisis reasoning of Casey for reaffirming Roe is no longer persuasive (if it ever was).").
137. See id ("The question of whether Precedent A has been undermined by Precedent B
(or series of precedents B, C, D, and E) is another way (albeit a roundabout, convoluted way) of
asking whether Precedent A is right or not.").
138. Supra Part II.A. 1.
139. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 308, 3 17-18 (1992).
140. Idat 301.
141. Nat'l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue of Ill., 386 U.S. 753, 756-58 (1967).
142. Quill, 504 U.S. at 298.
143. Id at 307-08.
144. Id.at 307.
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in a State for the imposition of duty to collect a use tax, we overrule those
holdings as superseded by developments in the law of due process."'
Notwithstanding its ruling on due process, the Court still had to decide
whether North Dakota's tax was an unconstitutional burden on interstate
commerce."' 6 The majority considered the argument that the rule of Bellas
Hess should be discarded because in subsequent cases "concerning other types
of taxes we have not adopted a similar bright-line, physical-presence
requremet."147 Yet it determined that "our reasoning in those cases does not
compel that we now reject the rule that Bellas Hess established in the area of
sales and use taxes." 148 The Court asserted that the specific rule announced in
Bellas Hess could be squared with modern Commerce Clause jurisprudence
even though inflexible, brightline tests seemingly had fallen out of favor.'14 9 It
also acknowledged the extensive reliance Bellas Hess had engendered, noting
that the rule of that case "has become part of the basic framework of a sizeable
industry."150 In the end, the Court concluded that "the continuing value of a
bright-line rule in this area and the doctrine and principles of stare decisis
indicate that the Bellas Hess rule remains good law."'15 ' Quill thus provides a
cautionary tale against sweeping generalizations about the merits and
sustainability of doctrinal remnants.
We might envision a related argument advocating reduced deference for
remnants on the theory that doctrinal outliers generate inconsistency, creating
costly inefficiencies in the judicial system and beyond.152 When one precedent
in a line of otherwise consistent decisions takes a sharp turn, it can require the
Court to engage in precarious line-drawing to determine where future cases fit
in. This difficulty trickles down to lower courts, attorneys, and other
145. Id. at 308.
146. See id. at 305 ('[Wlhile a State may, consistent with the Due Process Clause, have the
authority to tax a particular taxpayer, imposition of the tax may nonetheless violate the
Commerce Clause.').
147. Id. at 317.
148. Id.
149. See id. ("[A]Ithough in our cases subsequent to Bellas Hess and concerning other
types of taxes we have not adopted a similar ... requirement,. .. the continuing value of a
bright-line rule in this area and the doctrine and principles of stare decisis indicate that the
Bellas Hess rule remains good law.").
150. Id.; cf id at 321 (Scalia, J., concurring in part) ('Having affirmatively suggested that
the 'physical presence' rule could be reconciled with our new jurisprudence, we ought not visit
economic hardship upon those who took us at our word.").
151. Id. at 317 (majority opinion).
152. See John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130, 144 (2008) (Ginsburg,
J., dissenting) ("It damages the coherence of the law if we cling to outworn precedent at odds
with later, more enlightened decisions.").
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stakeholders, complicating their assessments of the legal landscape. Where the
distinction between run-of-the-mill precedents and outlier precedents is murky,
the aggregate effects may be considerable.
At bottom, though, this argument represents another way of talking about
the proper result on the merits. It reflects the underlying notion that consistent
lines of precedent are more desirable than inconsistent ones. The implication is
that in choosing the proper rule of decision to govern any given case, the Court
should prefer rules that are consistent with existing law and that reduce the
need for costly, uncertain line-drawing. This approach makes a great deal of
pragmatic sense. But it does not inform the question of how much deference is
owed to a precedent irrespective of the merits, making it exogenous to the
doctrine of stare decisis.
The interplay between Quill and Bellas Hess also suggests the flaws in
trying to justify the remnant consideration on reliance grounds. The reliance
argument would presume that stakeholders are relatively unlikely to put faith in
the continued vitality of a precedent that appears to be a remnant of an
abandoned doctrine.153 The reason is that stakeholders will view such
precedents as ripe for overruling just as soon as the Court finds the right
opportunity. The Quill Court's treatment of Bellas Hess shows why this
rationale should not be accepted as a general rule.15 4 Despite the strong
indications that Bellas Hess belonged to a simpler, bygone era of Commerce
Clause jurisprudence,'15 the Court preserved the decision by finding that it
"turned on a different logic and thus remained sound. 0 56 The Court also
focused on the reliance interests that would be upset by overruling Quill,
57
making plain its view that stakeholders had not abandoned all hope .'
Examples like Quill undermine the notion that some sort of consensus
necessarily develops around remnants of abandoned doctrines whereby
onlookers assume that an over-ruling is imminent. In reality, the situation is
more complicated, and assessing whether a given precedent is a remnant
153. See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 332 (1992) (White, J., dissenting in
part) ("To the extent Quill developed any reliance on the old rule, I would submit that its
reliance was unreasonable. .. .)
154. See id at 314 (majority opinion) ("Although we have not, in our review of other types
of taxes, articulated the same physical-presence requirement that Bellas Hess established for
sales and use taxes, that silence does not imply repudiation of the Bellas Hess rule.").
155. See id at 331 (White, J., dissenting in part) ("Though legal certainty promotes
business confidence, the mail-order business has grown exponentially despite the long line of
our own post-Bellas Hess precedents that signaled the demise of the physical presence
requirement.").
156. Id at 317 (majority opinion).
15 7. Id.
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doomed to overruling or rather a stalwart survivor that will continue to fend off
challenges is often uncertain. As Justice Scalia explained in his concurrence in
Quill, it is "important that we retain our ability .. , sometimes to adopt new
principles for the resolution of new issues without abandoning clear holdings of
the past that those principles contradict." 158 But "reliance upon a square,
unabandoned holding of the Supreme Court is always justifiable reliance
59
(though reliance alone may not always carry the day)."11
The point is punctuated by a series of recent decisions involving the
constitutional adequacy of criminal sentencing procedures. In 2000, the Court
shook up the doctrinal backdrop for sentencing decisions in Apprendi v. New
Jersey. 610 The case involved a New Jersey statute that authorized a judge to
increase a criminal defendant's sentence if the judge determined, based on the
preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant's offense was a hate cnime.
The defendant in Apprendi argued that this procedure violated his
constitutional rights. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that "any fact that
increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum
must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable dob.16 1
The Court also announced a curious exception: Its ruling did not apply to
"the fact of a prior conviction."162 The explanation for this exception traces
back to AlImendarez-Torres v. United States,16 3 where the Court indicated that
prior criminal convictions may, consistent with the Constitution, be treated as
mere sentencing factors rather than actual elements of the charged ofes.6
The Court in Apprendi recognized that its statements about the constitutional
requirements for sentencing were in tension with Almendarez-Torres, going so
far as to acknowledge the "arguable" possibility that "Almendarez-Torres was
incorrectly decided, and that a logical application of our reasoning today should
apply if the recidivist issue were contested." 16 ' That issue, though, was not
166
before the Apprendi Court, which saw fit to leave Almendarez-Torres intact.
We might have expected AlImendarez-Torres to fall soon after Apprendi.
Nearly a decade later, that has not occurred. Despite having received numerous
requests to overrule Al1mendarez- Torres, and despite having extended and
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

Id at 320-21 (Scalia, J., concurring in part).
Id. at 321 (emphasis in original).
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000).
Id
Id
Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 226 (1998).

164.

Id.

165.
166.

Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 489-90 (footnote omitted).
Id.at 490.
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expounded upon Apprendi's rule in several significant cases,16 7 the Court has
left Almendarez-Torres on the books.
Perhaps Almendarez-Torres cannot last much longer. Or perhaps it will
hang on indefinitely. Either way, Apprendi and its progeny tell us little about
whether Almendarez-Torres should be relied upon by stakeholders such as
prosecutors, defense attorneys, and legislators. It might be that all factual
determinations that extend a criminal sentence eventually will need to be
submitted to a jury. It might also be that there is a defensible justification for
treating prior criminal convictions as occupying a special category. In terms of
assessing the reliance implications of overruling precedent, the key issue is not
whether we view Almendarez-Torres as having its foundations eroded by
Apprendi and related cases. Rather, in asking whether a case like Al1mendarezTorres deserves deference, the inquiry should be much more direct: Do the
reliance interests implicated by the decision justify upholding it even if the
Court suspects or concludes that it is incorrect on the merits?
4. Unclean Hands
If a precedent represents a break from the cases that came before it, it
tends to receive diminished stare decisis effect. The principle resembles an
"unclean-hands" exception to the doctrine of stare decisis: An opinion borne of
inadequate respect for its ancestors should expect the same irreverent treatment
68
from its heirs.'1
A vivid example is Pennsylvania v. Union Gas

Co.,

69

which was

70
Florida.1

overruled by Seminole Tribe of Floridav.
In Union Gas, a fourJustice plurality concluded that Congress may use its powers under the
7
Commerce Clause to authorize lawsuits for money damages against states.'1'
(A fifth Justice concurred in the judgment.) The plurality reasoned that, "to the
extent that the States gave Congress the authority to regulate commerce, they

167. See, e.g., United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 226 (2005) (applying the Sixth
Amendment to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines); Blakelyv. Washington, 542 U.S. 296,305
(2004) (applying the Sixth Amendment to state sentencing laws).
168. Cf Frank H. Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 HARv. L. REv. 802, 817
(1982) ("[Elach Justice may find it advantageous to follow rules announced by his predecessors,
so that successors will follow his rules in turn.").
169. See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 5 (1989) (plurality opinion).
170. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 66 (1996).
171. Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 5 (plurality opinion).
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also relinquished their immunity where Congress found it necessary, in
172
exercising this authority, to render them liable."
Flash forward to 1995, when the Court revisited the issue in Seminole
Tribe.173 This time the Court went the other way, holding that Article I of the
Constitution does not authorize Congress to subject nonconsenting states to
lawsuits for money damages.174 In defending its refusal to stand by Union
Gas, the majority countered that Union Gas itself represented a reversal of
course: "The plurality's rationale . . . deviated sharply from our established
federalism jurisprudence and essentially eviscerated our decision in" Hans v.
Louisiana,71 5 which the majority described as embracing the "constitutional
principle that state sovereign immunity limited the federal courts' jurisdiction

under Article

111.0~76

For this and other reasons, the Court felt "bound to

conclude that Union Gas was wrongly decided and that it should be, and now
77
is, overruled."'

Once again, there are two principal ways we might explain the inclusion of
the unclean-hands consideration within the Court's stare decisis jurisprudence.
172. Id. at 19-20.
173. Technically, Seminole Tribe dealt with Congress's power to regulate commerce with
Indian tribes, not commerce among the several states as in Union Gas. Seminole Tribe, 517
U.S. at 47. The distinction is immaterial for our purposes.
174. Id.
175. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1890).
176. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44,64 (1996); see also id. at 65 ("Never
before the decision in Union Gas had we suggested that the bounds of Article III could be
expanded by Congress operating pursuant to any constitutional provision other than the
Fourteenth Amendment."); id. at 66 ("[B]oth the result in Union Gas and the plurality's
rationale depart from our established understanding of the Eleventh Amendment and undermine
the accepted function of Article Ill.").
177. Id;see also, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876,921 (2010) (Roberts, C.J.,
concurring) ("[A]s the majority explains, [the relevant precedent] was an 'aberration' insofar as
it departed from the robust protections we had granted political speech in our earlier cases.");
United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 521 (1995) ("That leaves as the sole prop for Sinclairits
reliance upon the unexamined proposition ...that materiality in perjury cases ...is a question
of law for the judge. But just as there is nothing to support Sinclair except that proposition,
there is ... nothing to support that proposition except Sinclair."); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Pena, 515 U.S. 200,231 (1995) (opinion of O'Connor, J.) ("Remaining true to an 'intrinsically
sounder' doctrine established in prior cases better serves the values of stare decisis than would
following a more recently decided case inconsistent with the decisions that came before it; the
latter course would simply compound the recent error. . . ."); United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S.
688, 704 (1993) ("Grady lacks constitutional roots. The 'same-conduct' rule it announced is
wholly inconsistent with earlier Supreme Court precedent and with the clear common-law
understanding of double jeopardy."); Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119 (1940) ("[S]tare
decisis is a principle of policy and not a mechanical formula of adherence to the latest decision,
however recent and questionable, when such adherence involves collision with a prior doctrine
more embracing in its scope, intrinsically sounder, and verified by experience.").
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The first is that deviations from established lines of precedent are more likely
to be wrong on the merits than opinions that are consistent with their
predecessors. Even if we accept that (oversimplified) premise, it is unhelpful
with respect to applying stare decisis in any given case; instead, it lapses into
conflation of merits issues with the proper question of how much deference is
78
due irrespective of a precedent's soundness.1
The second possible explanation for the unclean-hands consideration
reflects the importance of reliance interests. The argument would be that
deviations from established precedent engender relatively little reliance because
onlookers expect the Court to bring the outlying opinions back into line.
Likewise, stakeholders will be reluctant to rely on precedent that is the product
of overruling for fear that if the law was sufficiently fluid to permit the
pendulum to swing one way, it might allow the pendulum to swing back.
On either rationale, this reliance argument is difficult to accept. It seems
dubious to assert that a case like Union Gas inspired relatively little reliance
because stakeholders viewed it as a deviation from Hans. What is more, the
reliance argument is undermined by the fact that unclean-hands analysis will
often be indeterminate. Just think about the roster of questions that need to be
answered before an opinion can be classified as an interloper undeserving of
deference: Does it matter whether the Court squarely confronted the opinion's
antecedents as opposed to tacitly undercutting them? Is there any kind of
temporal limit on how far down a line of precedents the Court should look-a
sort of "adverse possession" whereby an opinion is eventually cleansed of its
transgressions and made worthy of full deference? Why doesn't the decision of
the later, outlier Court have a claim to enhanced deference precisely because it
was issued after the earlier precedents?179 And so on.
There is also the problem of interconnectedness. The law is full of
doctrines that are in some sense related. If the presence of an (arguably)
inconsistent precedent in any (arguably) related field is enough to call into
question an opinion's stare decisis effect, few opinions will be entitled to
deference. Moreover, searches for arguably inconsistent precedents will
frequently turn up conflicting results, leaving the deference issue unresolved
and robbing the unclean-hands consideration of any constructive function.

178. Supra Part 1I.A.1.
179. C( Larry Alexander, Constrainedby Precedent,63 S. CAL. L. REv. 1, 60-61 (1989)
("What is clear is that the reasons for constraining a court to follow a precedent court's rule
even when the constrained court believes the rule is ill-advised apply with no less force [when]
the constrained court thinks the precedent court's rule is a misinterpretation of an earlier court's
rule.").
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5. Synchronization
In United States v. Morrison,180 a case dealing with the scope of
congressional authority under the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court stated
that "[tlhe force of the doctrine of stare decisis behind [certain precedents]
stems not only from the length of time they have been on the books, but also
from the insight attributable to the Members of the Court" that issued the
decisions.'18 1 In two precedents the Morrison Court opted to follow, "[e]very
Member [of the deciding Court] had been appointed by President Lincoln,
Grant, Hayes, Garfield, or Arthur-and each of their judicial appointees
obviously had intimate knowledge and familiarity with the events
82
surrounding the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment."'
Similarly, in the recent wine-shipping cases,18 3 both Justice Stevens and
Justice Thomas expressed the view that precedents interpreting the TwentyFirst Amendment are entitled to heightened deference if they were issued
close in time to ratification by Justices that lived through the ratification
process. 18 Their rationale, like that of the Court in Morrison, is akin to a
preference for eye-witness testimony over hearsay: Those Justices who were
around to watch the enactment of a constitutional provision are presumed to
have unique insight into the provision's proper interpretation.
This presumption, which is based on the synchronization of a
provision' s enactment with its interpretation by the Court, needs a bit of
unpacking. With respect to any precedent the current Court is reconsidering,
if there is a record explaining why the enactment-era Justices felt as they did,
that record will be available to the later Court. Where it makes clear how the
case should come out, the result will be evident. If, by contrast, there is no
record to explain how the enactment-era Justices reached their conclusions,
any assumption about their special insight seems like a leap. It is unclear
why certain judges should be viewed as uniquely qualified to divine the
meaning of a constitutional provision simply by virtue of having been around
for its enactment. It can be difficult enough to agree on what the framers of a
180. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 601-02 (2000).
181. Id. at 622.
182. Id
183. See generally Granhoim. v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460 (2005).
184. See id at 495 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The views of judges who lived through~ the
debates that led to the ratification of those Amendments are entitled to special deference .. . .)
id at 522 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("Moreover, I would resolve any conflict in this Court's
precedents in favor of those cases most contemporaneous with the ratification of the Twentyfirst Amendment.").
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provision-those who actually had a role in negotiation, drafting, and
enactment-thought they were achieving. The assumption that judges who
may or may not have played a part in the enactment process automatically
possess some singular understanding is even more wobbly.
Of course, the current Court also faces risks of misinterpretation and
misapplication. At least where a case is exceptionally close or difficult, why
not defer to the prior Court-which at least might have had extra insightinstead of accepting the current Court's best guess?
This is a sensible question, but I think it underestimates the importance
of the Court's expression of its rationale. Even where an issue of
constitutional interpretation is extremely close, the Court will offer a
reasoned explanation of how it has reached its decision. The Court does not
simply hand down mandates from on high, but rather acknowledges an
obligation to explain itself to the public-and, through that
acknowledgement, promotes acceptance, stability, and the rule of law. By
contrast, if the current Court defers to a precedent on grounds of
synchronization, there is a vacuum where the rationale should have been.
The most we can surmise is that the current Court's practice is to defer; we
are left with no explanation of why the predecessor Court decided as it did,
which is critical to understanding why the law is the way it is. While it is
perfectly appropriate for the current Court to consult the sources used by its
predecessor, and to pay careful attention to whatever reasoning and analysis
was furnished by the prior Court, the notion that close cases should be
resolved on synchronization grounds is unpersuasive.
In any event, the synchronization argument goes only to the merits of the
case at hand, reflecting the chances that the precedent reflects a correct
interpretation of the law. As we have seen, merits-based considerations have
no legitimate station within stare decisis jurisprudence.
C. Technical Considerations
1. Nature of DecisionalRule
Certain categories of decisional rules receive greater deference than others.
A ready illustration comes from Payne v. Tennessee.185 As noted above, the
issue there was the admissibility of "victim-impact evidence" at the sentencing
phase of capital murder trials.186 In Payne, that evidence involved the suffering
185.
186.

Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 825 (1991).
Supra notes 107-10 and accompanying text.
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87
of a three-year-old boy whose mother and sister had been murdered .1
According to the defendant, introduction of the evidence violated the Eighth
Amendment by allowing the jury to base its sentencing determination on factors
88
unrelated to the defendant's true blameworthiness.1
Payne was not the Court's first foray into victim-impact evidence. Only
two years earlier, it held in South Carolinav. Gathers18 9 that such evidence was
forbidden by the Eighth Amendment.'"0 Gathers was a reaffirmance and an
extension of Booth v. Maryland,'9 ' itself decided two years prior.
In Payne, a new majority announced that it disagreed with the decisions in
Booth and Gathers. 92 Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the Court
interpreted the Constitution as providing that "a State may properly conclude
that for the jury to assess meaningfully the defendant's moral culpability and
blameworthiness, it should have before it at the sentencing phase evidence of
the specific harm caused by the defendant," including victim-impact
evidence.'19 The Court then moved to stare decisis, evaluating whether it
94
should retain Booth and Gathersnotwithstanding its disagreement with them.'1
Among other things, the Court focused on the nature of the rule in question. It
explained that "[clonsiderations in favor of stare decisis are at their acme in
cases involving property and contract rights, where reliance interests are
involved."195 By contrast, "the opposite is true in cases ...involving
procedural and evidentiary rules." 9 6 The issue in Payne did not involve
anything like a contractual right; rather, it dealt with the admissibility of certain
evidence at a death-penalty trial.' 97 The Court thus had little trouble finding
98
that stare decisis could not preserve Booth and Gathers.1
The current Court has continued to embrace this distinction between
property and contract rules on the one hand and evidentiary and procedural
rules on the other. A fresh example is Pearsonv. Callahan,'99decided in 2009.

187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

197.
198.
199.

Payne, 501 U.S. at 814-16.
Idat 816-17.
South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805 (1989).
Id. at 810.
Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987).
Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 825 (1991).
Id.
Id. at 827.
Id. at 828.
Id.
Supra notes 186-88 and accompanying text.
Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 830 (1991).
Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 818 (2009).
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Pearsondealt with the procedure a trial court should use in resolving a claim of
qualified immunity by a government official .200 The Court previously had
addressed this issue in Saucier v. Katz.20 1 Sauciertaught that a trial judge must
begin by considering whether the official violated the Constitution. 0 If the
answer was yes, the judge would then ask whether the violation involved a right
that was clearly established. 0 Only if the right was clearly established would
the invocation of qualified immunity be defeated. 2
Some critics, including Justices of the Supreme Court, viewed Saucier's
framework as unnecessarily formal and burdensome. 0 Pearson eventually
responded to that criticism by rejecting the Saucier approach as a mandatory
rule and, instead, giving trial courts the option of determining that a claimed
constitutional right was not clearly established without deciding whether the
right was actually violated. 0 On the topic of staredecisis, Pearsonexplained
that, "[flike rules governing procedures and the admission of evidence in the
trial courts," the sequence of a trial court's analysis in reviewing a defense of
qualified immunity "does not affect the way in which parties order their affairs"
2 07
and "would not upset settled expectations on anyone's part."
The issue is not always so straightforward. Consider Hohn v. United
States. 208 There, the Court asked whether it had jurisdiction "to review
decisions of the courts of appeals denying applications for certificates of
appealability," which a petitioner in a federal habeas corpus proceeding needs
in order to appeal from an adverse district court decision .2 09 The Court found
that it did indeed possess the requisite jurisdiction, but it acknowledged that its
conclusion was "in direct conflict" with a precedent issued some fifty years
earlier .2 10 Explaining its conclusion that the precedent should be overruled, the

200. Id. at 815-16.
201. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200-01 (2001).
202. Idat 201.
203. Id
204. Id
205. See, e.g., Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393,432 (2007) (Breyer, J., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part) ("I would end the failed Saucier experiment now.").
206. Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 818 (2009).
207. Id at 816 (citations omitted); see also, e.g., United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506,
521 (1995) (noting that the impact of stare decisis "is somewhat reduced .. , in the case of a
procedural rule such as this, which does not serve as a guide to lawful behavior").
208. Hohn v. United States, 524 U.S. 236, 253 (1998).
209. Id at 238-39.
2 10. Id at 25 1. The discordant precedent was House v. Mayo. House v. Mayo, 324 U.S.
42, 44 (1945) (per curiam).
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Court noted among other things that it will accord relatively little deference to a
"rule of procedure that does not alter primary conduct.",2 1 1
Justice Scalia's dissent described the basis for this practice as the
proposition that "procedural rules do not ordinarily engender detrimental
reliance., 212 As he explained, "ordinarily" is the key; procedural rules can
sometimes engender a great deal of reliance. Justice Scalia focused on
congressional reliance, asserting that "with [the precedent that Hohn overruled]
on the books[,] . .. Congress presumably anticipated that [the statutory
provision governing certificates of appealability] would be interpreted in the
same manner." 213 He concluded that the precedent should be preserved
"regardless of its virtue as an original matter.",2 14
Less important than choosing between the majority and dissenting
positions in Hohn is accounting for the disagreement itself. Whether a given
dispute deals with procedure or with substance has no inherent relevance to the
doctrine of stare decisis. The distinction is illuminating only insofar as it
affects reliance interests. And though it will often be the case that reliance
interests are upset relatively severely by altering substantive rules but relatively
211
Justice Scalia
mildly by altering procedural rules, that need not be true.
viewed the decision in Hohn as having generated significant reliance even
though it dealt with a procedural rule.2 1 For a starker example, consider the
attorney-client privilege: While privilege rules are evidentiary in nature and do
not affect the legality of primary conduct, the standards governing the scope of
the attorney-client privilege engender enormous reliance every day as
individuals and organizations structure their communications with legal
counsel.21
Hohn, 524 U.S. at 252.
Id. at 259 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
Id. at 262 (footnote omitted).
Id.at 259.
Cf. Jill E. Fisch, Retroactivity and Legal Change: An EquilibriumApproach, 10
HARV. L. REv. 1055, 1087 (1997) ("Substantive rules are not inherently more important to a
litigant than procedural rules; both can be outcome determinative. Procedural rules affect the
degree and quality of access to the legal system and thus determine the protection afforded by
substantive legal rules and remedies." (footnotes omitted)).
216. Supra notes 212-13 and accompanying text.
217. Cf Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) ("The attorney-client
privilege is the oldest of the privileges for confidential communications known to the common
law." (citations omitted)). "[Pirivilege 'is founded upon the necessity, in the interest and
administration of justice, of the aid of persons having knowledge of the law and skilled in its
practice, which assistance can only be safely and readily availed of when free from
consequences or the apprehension of disclosure."' Id. (quoting Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S.
464, 470 (1888)).
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
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The point is that the nature of a decisional rule is an imperfect proxy that
must not be mistaken for the underlying reliance implications of overruling a
particular precedent with its own factual backdrop. The wiser course is to resist
viewing the substantive/procedural distinction as carrying some independent
force, and to concentrate instead on the actual reliance interests at stake.
2. Voting Margins and Dissents
The number of votes a precedent commanded and the presence of a
vigorous dissent can affect the degree of deference the precedent receives. The
Court has described the question as whether the precedent was "decided by the
narrowest of margins, over spirited dissents challenging [its] basic

underpinnings.

218

One possible justification for this practice is that a divided Court and a
vigorous dissent signal an opinion's debatable foundations on the merits. 1
Such a theory is problematic for the reasons explained above; in short,
shoehomning consideration of the merits into the stare decisis inquiry is
unhelpful in determining whether a precedent warrants preservation
notwithstanding its wrongness. 2
Nor is a sharply divided Court necessarily indicative of an opinion that is
weak on the merits. When an issue divides the Court and prompts vigorous
dissents, the issue probably received full vetting and extensive consideration .22 '1
Justice Marshall made this point in Payne v. Tennessee, reasoning that "[tlhere
is nothing new in the majority's discussion of the supposed deficiencies in [the
two precedents under review]. Every one of the arguments made by the
22
majority can be found in the dissenting opinions filed in those two cases."

218. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828-29 (1991).
219. See Fisch, supra note 5, at 104 ("Presumably the Court views the technical
deficiencies in these cases as a proxy for merit-based analysis. For example, a close decision
arguably is less likely to be correct than one commanding the support of all nine Justices."
(footnote omitted)).
220. Supra Part II.A. 1.
221. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 925 (2010) (Roberts, C.J., concurring)
("We have ...had the benefit of a comprehensive dissent that has helped ensure that the Court
has considered all the relevant issues."); Charles Fried, Comment, Five to Four: Reflections on

the School Voucher Case, 116

HARv. L. REv.

163, 179 (2002) ("By writing a vigorous dissent

that points out all the terrible implications of the court's opinion, the record stands that the court
was aware of this and was willing to go ahead anyway." (footnote omitted)).
222. Payne, 501 U.S. at 846 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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Indeed, one might suggest that a later Court should sometimes accord
enhanced deference to this type of battle-tested, fully-vetted opinion. As the
223
Court wrote in Pattersonv. McLean Credit Union:
The arguments about whether [the relevant precedent] was decided
correctly in light of the language and history of the statute were examined
and discussed with great care in our decision. It was recognized at the time
that a strong case could be made for the [opposing view] .. . but that view
did not prevail.22
These examples illustrate why it is impossible to make any absolute
pronouncements about the relationship between a precedent's correctness on
the merits and the degree to which it divided the Court.
Alternatively, we might try to preserve the "divisiveness" factor by falling
back on reliance interests. The argument would be that a five-to-four decision
means the Court is only one vote away from changing its mind .225 As a result,
stakeholders will shy away from ordering their affairs based on assumptions
about the decision's continuing vitality. The problem with this argument is that
it depends on a lengthy string of contingencies. The issue that was before the
Court must arise again in a context that provides a suitable vehicle for review.
There must be four votes in favor of granting certiorari to reconsider the issue.
A new Justice or a member of the former majority must overcome
compunctions about stare decisis to vote with the former dissenters, and all the
former dissenters must overcome similar compunctions to vote in favor of
overruling. This pervasive uncertainty undermines the argument that
stakeholders will necessarily decline to rely on a precedent because of its
closely divided nature.
III, Reliance-Lite
I suggested in the previous Part that modern stare decisisjurisprudence is
most usefully viewed as an assemblage of overgeneralized proxies for the
reliance interests implicated by the overruling of a precedent.
The Court's proclivity for employing proxies does not mean it never
discusses reliance interests directly. Its decisions often emphasize the
223. See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 171 (1989), superseded by
statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 101, 105 Stat. 1071, 1071-72.
224. Id. (citations omitted).
225. See Fried, supra note 221, at 177 (noting that a 5-4 ruling "is definitive only if the
four dissenters should, or will, accept the decision from which they dissented, rather than hold
on until they can pick up a fifth vote").
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relationship between stare decisis and reliance. For example, we find the Court
explaining that "[s]tare decisis has added force when the legislature, in the
public sphere, and citizens, in the private realm, have acted in reliance on a
previous decision, for in this instance overruling the decision would dislodge
26
settled rights and expectations or require an extensive legislative response.0
It likewise has stated that "reliance interests are of particular relevance because
'[a]dherence to precedent promotes stability, predictability, and respect for
judicial authority."'2 2 7 In a more targeted fashion, the Court has invoked
reliance interests to support a distinction, discussed above, between property or
contract rules and procedural or evidentiary rules, reasoning that
"considerations in favor of stare decisis are at their acme in cases involving
2 28
property and contract rights, where reliance interests are involved.
Unfortunately, the Court's analyses usually rest on abstract conclusions
about reliance considerations rather than rigorous, case-specific examinations.
PlannedParenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvaniav. Casey is instructive. In
that case, which is discussed above, 2 the question was whether a Pennsylvania
statute that imposed certain restrictions on abortions violated the reproductive
rights articulated in Roe v. Wade. 230 The Casey Court deemed it appropriate to
reconsider Roe's "central holding" that the time at which a fetus becomes viable
"marks the earliest point at which the State's interest in fetal life is
constitutionally adequate to justify a legislative ban on nontherapeutic
abortions.",23 ' The Court recognized that "the classic case for weighing reliance
heavily in favor of following the earlier rule occurs in the commercial
context. .. where advance planning of great precision is most obviously a

226. Hilton v. S.C. Pub. Rys. Conin'n, 502 U.S. 197, 202 (1991).
227. Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Director, 504 U.S. 768, 783 (1992) (quoting Hilton, 502 U.S. at
202); see also, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1,34 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting
in part) ("[Tf~he mere venerability of an answer consistently adhered to for almost a century, and
the difficulty of changing, or even clearly identifying, the intervening law that has been based on
that answer, strongly argue against a change."); Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 673 (1990)
(Scalia, J., concurring in part) ("The doctrine [of stare decisisj exists for the purpose of
introducing certainty and stability into the law and protecting the expectations of individuals
and institutions that have acted in reliance on existing rules."); Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S.
808, 834-35 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("The doctrine, to the extent it rests on anything
more than administrative convenience, is merely the application to judicial precedents of a more
general principle that the settled practices and expectations of a democratic society should
generally not be disturbed by the courts.").
228. Payne, 501 U.S. at 828 (majority opinion) (citations omitted).
229. Supra notes 126-30 and accompanying text.
230. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
231. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 860 (1992).
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necessity. 232 By comparison, one might argue that "reproductive planning
could take virtually immediate account of any sudden restoration of state
authority to ban abortions. 233 Yet the Court found that defining the scope of
implicated reliance interests in such a limited fashion would disregard "the fact
that for two decades of economic and social developments, people have
organized intimate relationships and made choices that define their views of
themselves and their places in society, in reliance on the availability of abortion
in the event that contraception should fail."2 34 It concluded that "while the
effect of reliance on Roe cannot be exactly measured, neither can the certain
cost of overruling Roe for people who have ordered their thinking and living
2 35
around that case be dismissed.
A similar theme is visible in Dickerson v. United States,236 where the
Court reaffirmed its prior holding in Miranda regarding the admissibility of
statements stemming from custodial interrogations of suspected criminals.
Miranda, of course, led to the set of police warnings for arrestees that have
percolated throughout American culture and society. 237 In approaching the
issue of stare decisis, the Dickerson Court acknowledged how Miranda had
taken root in the popular consciousness. 3 Concluding that "Miranda has
become embedded in routine police practice to the point where the warnings
have become part of our national culture," the Court determined that the
precedent must be upheld. 3
Both Casey and Dickerson invoke broad notions of reliance to support
their applications of stare decisis. In Casey, the operative concept was the
disruption of those who have "ordered their thinking" around Roe; in
Dickerson, it was the difficulties inherent in revising "part of our national
culture." 240 But in neither case did the Court take the next step by delving into
232. Id. at 855-56 (citations omitted).
233. Id. at 856.
234. Id
235. Id.
236. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
237. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
238. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 443.
239. Id; cf. Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 330 (1999) ("Principles once unsettled
can find general and wide acceptance in the legal culture, and there can be little doubt that the
rule prohibiting an inference of guilt from a defendant's rightful silence has become an essential
feature of our legal tradition."); id at 331-32 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that "Wide
acceptance in the legal culture" can be "adequate reason not to overrule" a precedent).
240. See Emery G. Lee III, OverrulingRhetoric: The Court's New Approach to Stare
Decisis in ConstitutionalCases, 33 U. TOL. L. REv. 581, 614 (2002) ("[T]he Dickerson opinion
[uses] a form of Casey's broad-ranging inquiry into reliance on civil-liberties decisions ...
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the reliance interests at stake: 24' What exactly those interests consisted of, how
widely they were shared, how severe the disruption would be if the applicable
precedent were overruled, and so on. Instead of spelling out how the particular
reliance interests might be affected and what the likely consequences would be,
the Court briefly nodded toward the importance of reliance and then forged
ahead.
The extent of reliance on a Supreme Court precedent is too important, and
too complex, to be resolved in such abbreviated fashion. If the doctrine of
stare decisis is to gain predictability and theoretical coherence, we need a new
framework for conducting rigorous, systematic, and consistent analysis of
reliance implications.
IV Rethinking Reliance
Developing a framework to analyze reliance interests requires identifying
the discrete ways in which reliance on a precedent can manifest itself. The
universe of reliance interests can be usefully (if roughly) divided into four
categories: reliance by specific individuals, groups, and organizations; reliance
by governments; reliance by courts; and reliance by society at large.

[suggesting] that reliance weighs against overruling a precedent to the extent that it has 'become
part of our national culture,' even when members of the Court have their doubts about its
constitutional underpinnings." (footnote omitted)).
241. Chief Justice Rehnquist made this point in Casey:
The joint opinion .. . turns to what can only be described as an unconventionaland unconvincing-notion of reliance, a view based on the surmise that the
availability of abortion since Roe has led to "two decades of economic and social
developments" that would be undercut if the error of Roe were recognized.... The
joint opinion's assertion ofthis fact is undeveloped and totally conclusory. In fact,
one cannot be sure to what economic and social developments the opinion is
referring.
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 956 (1992) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in
the judgment in part and dissenting in part); see also id. at 957 ("[T]he joint opinion's argument
is based solely on generalized assertions about the national psyche, on a belief that the people of
this country have grown accustomed to the Roe decision..,. and have 'ordered their thinking
and living around it."'). In Dickerson, Chief Justice Rehnquist-who authored the majority
opinion-was on the other end of a similar criticism; Justice Scalia countered: "I am not
convinced by petitioner's argument that Miranda should be preserved because the decision
occupies a special place in the 'public's consciousness.' . .. As far as I am aware, the public is
not under the illusion that we are infallible." Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 464 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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A. Specific Reliance
The most evident way that a Supreme Court precedent engenders reliance
is by encouraging individuals or groups to behave in a certain manner on the
understanding that the precedent is, and will remain, the law of the land.
Return to Quill Corp. v. North Dakota.24 2 That case involved an attempt
by North Dakota to impose tax-collection obligations on mail-order retailers
who were located outside the state. One of the issues before the Court was
whether the law was permissible under the Commerce Clause. 4 At the center
of the dispute was Bellas Hess, a precedent that created a safe harbor by
insulating from such laws all vendors "whose only connection with customers
in the [taxing] State is by common carrier or the United States mail., 244 The
Quill Court conceded that Bellas Hess was something of a relic, noting that
"lour cases subsequent to Bellas Hess and concerning other types of taxes ...
24 5
have not adopted a similar bright-line, physical-presence requirement ."
Still, the Court reaffirmed Bellas Hess on the Commerce Clause issue.2 4
It based its decision in part on the reliance interests at stake.2 4 The Court noted
that "the Bellas Hess rule has engendered substantial reliance and become part
of the basic framework of a sizeable industry. 2 48 Whatever the doctrinal
nuances and factual niceties at stake in a given case, Bellas Hess taught vendors
that if they limited their contacts with a state to the shipment of goods for
249
delivery to in-state customers, they were safe from tax-collection obligations.
Quill accordingly provides a good example of what we might think of as
specific reliance: Reliance upon a precedent by a discrete group of private
citizens or entities (such as mail-order vendors).2 5
242.

Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992).

243.

Id. at 298.

244.

Nat'l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue of Ill., 386 U.S. 753, 758 (1967).
Quill, 504 U.S. at 317. For more on Quill, see supra notes 139-59 and accompanying

245.
text.
246.

247.
248.

Quill, 504 U.S. at 317.

Id.
Jd.

249. Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 758. Justice White was not persuaded by the majority's
treatment of reliance. See Quill, 504 U.S. at 331-32 (White, J., dissenting in part) ("Neither
Quill nor any of its amici point to any investment decisions or reliance interests that suggest any
unfairness in overturning Bellas Hess.").
250. Id. at 317; see also, e.g., United States v. Title Ins. & Trust Co., 265 U.S. 472, 486
(1924) ("The [precedent was issued] twenty-three years ago and affected many tracts of
land.... In the meantime there has ben... continuous growth and development [and] .. .
reliance on the decision. It has become a rule of property, and to disturb it now would be
fraught with many injurious results.").
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By respecting individuals' and groups' reliance on heretofore-settled
251
precedents, the Court promotes something simple and elemental: Fairness.
Citizens who do their best to comply with the law only to find that the rules
have changed may feel forsaken by the very government whose edicts they
endeavored to respect. For similar reasons, protecting specific reliance interests
through the mechanism of stare decisis has critical importance to the rule of
law.25 When conscientious citizens act in good faith based on the Supreme
Court's past pronouncements but end up on the wrong side of the law, their
confidence in the Court and the overarching legal structure might well be
shaken. 5 These consequences should weigh on the Court's collective mind
when it is deciding whether a precedent warrants overruling.
B. Governmental Reliance
Like private citizens, our legislative and executive branches of government
rely on the Supreme Court's rulings as setting the rules of the road. Sometimes
this reliance is apparent, as when Congress enacts campaign-finance legislation
designed to comply with the dictates of the First Amendment as articulated in
cases like Buckley v. Valeo.25 Other times the link is less obvious but just as
important. Take, for example, The Legal Tender Cases,255 which held that the

Constitution permits Congress to issue paper money. 256 Congress has relied on

251. Cf Landsgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 265 (1994) ("Elementary
considerations of fairness dictate that individuals should have an opportunity to know what the
law is and to conform their conduct accordingly; settled expectations should not be lightly
disrupted."). Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens explained: "The presumption against
statutory retroactivity has consistently been explained by reference to the unfairness of imposing
new burdens on persons after the fact." Id. at 270.
252. See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 921 (2010) (Roberts, C.J.,
concurring) (stating that stare decisis's "greatest purpose is to serve a constitutional ideal--the
rule of law"); Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172 (1989) ("[S]taredecisis is a
basic self-governing principle within the Judicial Branch, which is entrusted with the sensitive
and difficult task of fashioning and preserving a jurisprudential system that is not based upon
,an arbitrary discretion. "' (quoting THE FEDERALISTNO. 78, at 490 (A. Hamilton) (H. Lodge ed.

1888))).
253. See, e.g., Jan G. Laitos, The New Retroactivity CausationStandard,51

ALA. L. REV.
1123, 1132 (2000) (noting that the upsetting of settled expectations "is inconsistent with a
central purpose of law in a civilized society, which is to preserve the expectations of individuals
that are formed in light of existing laws, as well as actions taken in reliance on those laws").
254. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiarn).
255. The Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. 457, 547 (1870).
2 56. Id.
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this power in setting up a complex financial system of enormous breadth and
complexity.
When the Court overrules a precedent upon which Congress has relied, it
does more than render (retroactively) that use of congressional time to have
been wasteful. It also forces Congress to expend energy and resources looking
for new ways to achieve legislative goals that previously were thought to be
accomplished. In some cases, the Court's change of heart may disrupt a
legislative regime that sends ripples throughout society. For example, some
scholars believe The Legal Tender Cases are inconsistent with the original
understanding of the Constitution. 5 Any thoughts the Court might entertain of
reconsidering those cases would need to account for the potentially significant
disruption of reliance interests that such a reversal could cause .2
Or recall Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., dealing with the power of
citizens to sue nonconsenting states.2 5 Justice Scalia wrote separately to
highlight the importance of preserving Hans v. Louisiana,260 aprecedent from
1890 holding that "the Eleventh Amendment precludes individuals from
bringing damages suits against States in federal court even where the asserted
basis ofjurisdiction is not diversity of citizenship but the existence of a federal
question.",2 6 ' In defending his position, Justice Scalia emphasized the degree to
which Congress may have relied upon Hans in choosing not to take certain
actions:
Hans has had a pervasive effect upon statutory law, automatically assuring
that private damages actions created by federal law do not extend against
the States. Forty-nine Congresses since Hans have legislated under that
assurance. It is impossible to say how many extant statutes would have

257. See, e.g., Monaghan, supra note 38, at 744 ("[I]t seems clear that under the 1789
Constitution only metal could constitute legal tender.... In fact, until driven to do so by the
exigencies of the Civil War, the national government never attempted to impart that quality to
paper.",).
258. See, e.g., id ("[Iln our age of checks, credit cards, and electronic banking, the issue is
off the agenda: no Supreme Court would now reexamine the merits."); Richard J. Pierce, Jr.,
Reconciling Chevron and Stare Decisis, 85 GEO. L.J. 2225, 2244 (1997) ("[Ilt is unimaginable
that the Court would overrule [The Legal Tender Cases]. ... The Court would be behaving in
an extraordinarily irresponsible manner if it overruled a precedent in circumstances in which its
decision destroyed trillions of dollars of investments made in reliance on that precedent.").
Contra Randy E. Barnett, it's a Bird, It's a Plane, No, It's Super-Precedent: A Response to
Farber and Gerhardt, 90 MiNN. L. REv. 1232, 1246 (2006) (arguing that the likely consequences
of overruling The Legal Tender Cases have been overstated).
259. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989).
260. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
261. Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 30 (Scalia, J., dissenting in part).
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included an explicit preclusion of suits against States if it had not been
thought that such suits were automatically barred. 6

A comparable illustration comes from Arizona v. Gant,263 which dealt with
the authority of police officers to search the passenger compartment of an
automobile after arresting one of the vehicle's occupants. 2 As relevant here,
the Court rejected the argument that an arrest empowers officers to search a
vehicle even where "the arrestee has been secured and cannot access the
265
interior of the vehicle. "
Justice Alito dissented, agreeing with the State of Arizona that the rule
embraced by the majority was at odds with Supreme Court precedent. 6 He
focused on the reliance interests of police departments that had integrated the
applicable precedent-a case called New York v. Belton2 67 -into their training
268
and operating procedures.
As Justice Alito saw it, "[t]he Belton rule has
been taught to police officers for more than a quarter century," and "reliance by
law enforcement officers is .. . entitled to weight."2 69 For its part, the majority
acknowledged that the interpretation of Belton urged by Justice Alito and the
State of Arizona "has been widely taught in police academies and that law
enforcement officers have relied on the rule in conducting vehicle searches
during the past 28 years.",270 Nevertheless, it reasoned that "[tlhe fact that the
law enforcement community may view the State's version of the Belton rule as
an entitlement does not establish the sort of reliance interest that could
outweigh the countervailing interest that all individuals share in having their
27
constitutional rights fully protected.", '
For one final perspective on governmental reliance, consider the universe
of campaign-finance regulation. As suggested above, the modem law is
founded upon Buckley v. Valeo and its progeny, which define the First

262. Id. at 35. Contra TaME, supra note 87, at 241 n.139 ('These justifications are
plausible, but not compelling, reasons for adhering to Hans. Why, for example, would it be
impractical, if Hans were overruled today, for Congress to review the United States Code and
add explicit limitations on private damages actions against states where Congress thought
appropriate?").
263. Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1714 (2009).
264. Id.
265. Id. at 1714.
266. Id. at 1726-32 (Alito, J., dissenting).
267. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 462-63 (1981).
268. Gaint, 129 S. Ct. at 1728 (Alito, J., dissenting).
269. Id.
270. Id. at 1722 (majority opinion).
271. Id at 1723.
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Amendment limits on legislators' authority to restrict political contributions and
expenditures. 7
The Court previously has acknowledged the degree of
legislative reliance in deciding whether to revisit the governing precedents.
Thus, in considering (and, eventually, rebuffing) a recent request to overhaul its
campaign-finance jurisprudence, Justice Breyer noted that "Buckley has
promoted considerable reliance. Congress and state legislatures have used
2 73
Buckley when drafting campaign finance laws."
But during its latest foray the Court took a markedly different approach.
In Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission,274 the Court overruled
Austin v. Michigan Chamberof Commerce,27 5 a precedent from 1990 bearing
on the First Amendment protections afforded to corporate political speech. The
Court acknowledged the argument that Austin had prompted considerable
legislative reliance, but its response was curt: "Legislatures may have enacted
bans on corporate expenditures believing that those bans were constitutional.

This is not a compelling interest for stare decisis."276 Elaborating, the Court
invoked no less an authority than Marbury v. Madison, reasoning that if stare
decisis were deemed to be a "compelling interest" for stare decisis purposes,
"legislative acts could prevent us from overruling our own precedents, thereby

interfering with our duty 'to say what the law is."' 277 Indissent, Justice Stevens
emphasized that "[s]tate legislatures have relied on their authority to regulate
corporate electioneering, confirmed in Austin, for more than a century," and
that "[tlhe Federal Congress has relied on this authority for a comparable
stretch of time, and it specifically relied on Austin throughout the years it spent
developing and debating [the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002].27
Given the majority's muscular language, one might surmise that Citizens
United renders legislative reliance irrelevant. Yet that interpretation would
272. Buckley v. Valco, 424 U.S. 1, 4 (1976) (per curiam).
273. Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 244 (2006) (opinion of Breyer, J.); see also, e.g.,
Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 567-68 (2002) (plurality opinion) ("Legislatures and
their constituents have relied upon [the relevant precedent] to exercise control over sentencing
through dozens of statutes like the one the Court approved in that case. ... We see no reason to
overturn those statutes or cast uncertainty upon the sentences imposed under them."); Bush v.
Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 982 (1996) (plurality opinion) ("Legislators and district courts nationwide
have modified their practices-or, rather, reembraced the traditional districting practices that
were almost universally followed before the 1990 census-in response to ShawL" (citing Shaw
v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 657 (1993))).
274. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
275. Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 668 (1990).
276. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 913.
277. Id. (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)).
278. Id. at 940 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).
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portray the majority as having renounced, with little explanation and in one fell
279
swoop, every previous reference to legislative reliance in the Court's annals.
Such an interpretation would also excise from the stare decisis analysis a
consideration that carries broad pragmatic significance and that plugs into the
fundamental, critical, and nuanced relationship between coequal branches of
government. For these reasons, I am inclined to read the majority's discussion
as standing for the more moderate proposition that legislative reliance was
insufficient-or, in the majority's parlance, "'not ... compelling",2'8 -to save
Austin given the wrongness (in the majority's view) of that precedent combined
with the deleterious effects of leaving it on the books.
Whatever the majority's intentions in Citizens United, I do not see much
to be gained by preemptively resolving to ignore the legislators who attempt to
put the Court's decisions into practice. Nor is there reason to fear that
acknowledging the potential legitimacy of legislative reliance would somehow
intrude upon the judicial province of declaring "what the law is." Where
circumstances warrant, the Court can and should feel empowered to overrule
even those precedents which have commanded substantial legislative reliance.
That freedom, however, does not foreclose the Court from at least considering
the impact of legislative reliance as one component of its stare decisis calculus.
Put differently, none of this is to imply that governmental reliance
precludes the overruling of precedent. It will sometimes be the case that the
importance of reaching the right result on the merits outweighs the costs of
upsetting governmental reliance interests-just as, to return to the previous
section, it will sometimes be appropriate to overrule a precedent despite its
disruptiveness for various individuals and groups. In other instances,
particularly where an extensive and entrenched legal apparatus (for example,
the modern administrative state 28 I) is concerned, governmental reliance might
present a more persuasive reason for upholding a precedent. The key takeaway
is simply that whenever the machinery of stare decisis is engaged,
governmental reliance interests should receive direct and detailed
consideration.

279. E.g., Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 244 (2006) (opinion of Breyer, J.); Harris v.
United States, 536 U.S. 545, 567-68 (2002) (plurality opinion); Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952,
982 (1996) (plurality opinion); Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 30 (1989) (Scalia,
J., dissenting in part).
280. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 913 (2010).
281. See Monaghan, supra note 38, at 745 ("Is it conceivable that the Court would outlaw
the administrative state? Certainly administrative legislation, in some substantial form, is a
permanent feature of our constitutional order.").
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C. DoctrinalReliance
It is not just the legislative and executive branches that rely on Supreme
Court precedent. It is also the judiciary, including the Supreme Court itself.
This reliance leads to the creation of doctrinal structures in which one
precedent builds on another that builds on another. If a foundational
precedent-one on which many others depend-were to be overruled, an entire
structure could waver or topple, upsetting settled expectations and creating
widespread uncertainty about the state of the law.
A ready example is the Court's incorporation of (most of) the Bill of
Rights as enforceable against the states via the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause. 282 If the Court were to conclude that, upon further reflection,
the Fourteenth Amendment actually does not apply the Bill of Rights to the
states, but rather creates some other set of individual liberties that must be
divined from a different source using a different method of analysis, an
important facet of modem constitutional law would disintegrate. Among the
potential casualties would be the numerous Supreme Court precedents that have
clarified how specific constitutional rights constrain various actions by states.
The very relationship between states and their citizens could take on, at least
temporarily, a feeling of ambiguity and uncertainty. In short, the day that such
an opinion was issued might well be a day of doctrinal disarray. That does not
necessarily mean the Court should deem itself barred from ever reconsidering
the root incorporation issue. It simply means the reliance implications should
matter.
We can afford to be relatively brief in our discussion of doctrinal reliance
because the Court generally does a good job of highlighting it. For instance, in
Welch v. Texas Departmentofffighways andPublicTransportation28-oef
the predecessors of Union Gas, discussed above 2 84 -a plurality noted that
rejecting Hans v. Louisiana would mean "overrul~ing] at least 17 cases, in
addition to Hans itself," while also undercutting a "variety of other cases that
were concerned with this Court's traditional treatment of sovereign
immunity. 285 More recently, the Court rebuffed an attempt to revisit Buckley
282. See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 27, at 584 ("[iNjumerous pillars of contemporary law
would be thrown into doubt if the underlying issues needed to be reviewed afresh without a
presumption of stability. These include holdings that the Bill of Rights applies to the
states .. . ." (footnote omitted)).
283. Welch v. Tex. Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 475-76 (1987)
(plurality opinion).
284. Supra Part II.13.4.
285. Welch, 483 U.S. at 494 n.27.
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v. Valec, with Justice Breyer noting that the Court "has followed Buckley,
2 86
upholding and applying its reasoning in later cases.",
Statements like these reflect entrenched norms of Supreme Court
discourse. Fealty to precedent is such a well-accepted virtue that there are few
surer ways for a dissent to score rhetorical points against the majority (or vice
versa) than by charging it with eschewing a slew of controlling precedents. 8
That explains why the Court tends to be solicitous of doctrinal reliance. Still,
there is much room for improvement. As with specific reliance and
governmental reliance, the Court could enhance its analysis by asking targeted
questions such as how much judicial work would need to be redone and what
consequences would occur in the interim while lower courts were reacting to
the overruling of an important precedent. The absence of inquiries like these
leaves the modem jurisprudence abstract and underdeveloped.
D. Societal Reliance

Sometimes the reliance a precedent has generated is unrelated to specific
behaviors. It owes instead to the effect of the precedent on shaping societal
perceptions about our country, our government, and our rights. 8 Though this
societal reliance can be a complex and daunting concept, it is a necessary
component of any stare decisisjurisprudence that aims to be complete.
Begin with Dickerson v. United States. The issue in that case was whether
the Court should reverse Miranda and adopt a different test, this one dictated
by federal statute, for determining the admissibility of statements by suspected
criminals. 2 89 In the course of reaffiming Miranda,the Dickerson Court drew
286.

Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 244 (2006) (opinion of Breyer, J.).

287. See John Paul Stevens, The Life Span of a Judge-Made Rule, 58 N.Y.U. L. Rnv. 1, 4
(1983) ("The decisional process invariably involves a study and analysis of relevant precedents.
In conference deliberation precedents regularly provide the basis for analysis and discussion.
The fr-amework for most Court opinions is created by previously decided cases."); Barrett, supra
note 33, at 103 1-32 ("That judges feel stare decisis operating directly upon them in a personal
way, rather than upon litigants, is made evident simply by the number of times phrases like 'we
are constrained by' and 'we are bound by' appear in judicial opinions."); Michael J. Gerhardt,
The Irrepressibilityof Precedent,86 N.C. L. REv. 1107, 1279, 1283 (2008) ("[Tlhere is strong
evidence of the Court's adherence to precedent as a modality of constitutional argumentation.");
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("Although there have been many overrulings in American law, they are rare in the day-to-day
work of any appellate court, even the Supreme Court. Distinguishing a precedent to death is
much more common.").
288. See, e.g., Hardy, supra note 56, at 592 (describing societal reliance as "how much the
public or culture-at-large has come to rely on a particular precedent").
289. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 43 1-32 (2000).
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on notions of societal reliance. While it might be true that no identifiable
arrestees could be said to have relied on Miranda in deciding how to behave,
the Court took a broader view, explaining that "Mirandahas become embedded
in routine police practice to the point where the warnings have become part of
our national culture.0 9 0 As the Court clarified during a recent discussion of
Dickerson, the opinion in that case "was referring not to police reliance on a
rule requiring them to provide warnings but to the broader societal reliance on
29
that individual right.", 1

A conceptual converse of Dickerson is Lawrence v. Texas, which dealt
with the constitutionality of a state law that criminalized sexual contact between
persons of the same gender. 9 The Lawrence Court overruled Bowers v.

Hardwick,29 1which held that the Constitution did not prohibit such laws. 294 In
articulating its rationale, the Lawrence majority found that "there has been no
individual or societal reliance on Bowers of the sort that could counsel against
295
overturning its holding once there are compelling reasons to do So. "
The dissenters in Lawrence objected to the majority's handling of the
reliance question. Justice Scalia described the degree of societal reliance on
Bowers's underlying principles as "overwhelming. 2 9 6 He elaborated:
"Countless judicial decisions and legislative enactments have relied on the
ancient proposition that a governing majority's belief that certain sexual
behavior is 'immoral and unacceptable' constitutes a rational basis for

regulation.

297

290. Id. at 443; cf. CARDozo, supra note 4, at 150 (stare decisis has less force where a
precedent "has been found to be inconsistent with the sense of justice or with the social
welfare").
291. Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1723 (2009). But see id. at 1728-29 (Alito, J.,
dissenting) ("The Dickerson opinion makes no reference to 'societal reliance,' .. .
292. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003).
293. Bowers v. Hardwick 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
294. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
295. Id. at 577.
296. Id. at 589 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
297. Id For an interesting discussion of societal reliance from the Court's October 2008
Term, see Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079, 2098 (2009) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice
Stevens argued:
[T~he Court fails to identify the real reliance interest at issue in this case: the
public's interest in knowing that counsel, once secured, may be reasonably relied
upon as a medium between the accused and the power of the State. That interest
lies at the heart of the Sixth Amendment's guarantee, and is surely worthy of
greater consideration than it is given by today's decision.
Id.
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Cases like Dickerson and Lawrence signal the rightful role of societal
reliance in stare decisis debates. If a Supreme Court precedent has become
ingrained in the American consciousness, it makes sense for the Court to
consider the societal effects of overruling that precedent. Our foundational
legal norms are part of what we use to understand the relationships between and
among citizens and governments. When those norms are revised in important
ways, our belief system can be affected .298 This is true even if no individual
citizen can point to specific behaviors he undertook on the assumption that a
precedent would remain in force. Of course, evaluating diffuse societal
reliance interests can be a difficult and uncertain enterprise. But that is not a
justification for ignoring those interests or for dismissing them with vague,
conclusory statements.
One caveat is in order. In thinking about societal reliance, we should be
careful not to conflate it with another concept that sometimes appears in stare
decisis analyses: Societal approval of the Court's decision to overrule a
precedent. To illustrate, consider Vasquez v. Hillery,299 a 1986 opinion holding
that when a grand jury is selected through racially discriminatory means, any
conviction flowing from the grand jury's indictment must be invalidated as
violating the Equal Protection Clause .3 00 Explaining that its decision in
Vasquez was based on "more than a century of consistent precedent," the Court
noted the importance not just of being principled, but also appearing to be:
Stare decisis "permits society to presume that bedrock principles are founded in
the law rather than in the proclivities of individuals, and thereby contributes to
the integrity of our constitutional system of government, both in appearance
30
and in fact." '
A more widely debated example comes from Planned Parenthoodof
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, where the Court rejected the argument
that Roe v. Wade's central holding should be overruled. 0 The majority was
frank in its desire to protect the Court's "capacity to exercise the judicial power
and to function as the Supreme Court of a Nation dedicated to the rule of
law."3 03 It explained that the Court's "power lies .. . in its legitimacy, a product
of substance and perception that shows itself in the people's acceptance of the
298. C( Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992) ("[T]he very
concept of the rule of law underlying our own Constitution requires such continuity over time
that a respect for precedent is, by definition, indispensable.").
299. Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 260-64 (1986).
300. Id. at 264.
301. Id. at 260, 265-66.
302. Casey, 505 U.S. at 854-61.
303. Id. at 865.
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Judiciary as fit to determine what the Nation's law means and to declare what it
demands."004 That legitimacy, in turn, "depends on making legally principled
decisions under circumstances in which their principled character is sufficiently
plausible to be accepted by the Nation.0 05 And while the country ordinarily
tolerates the Court's occasional need to revisit precedents, where a decision
"1resolve[s] the sort of intensely divisive controversy reflected in Roe and those
rare, comparable cases," that decision must receive "equally rare precedential
force to counter the inevitable efforts to overturn it and to thwart its
implementation. 3 06 Casey thus made clear that at least in "rare" situations of
acute "national controversies," the Court will be extraordinarily reluctant to
307
overrule its precedents based on concerns over perceived legitimacy.
Justice Scalia criticized this rationale, asserting that "[t]he only principle
the Court 'adheres' to. ...is the principle that the Court must be seen as
standing by Roe. That is not a principle of law .. , but a principle of
Realpolitik-and a wrong one at that."3 08 Making himself even plainer, Justice
Scalia noted that "I cannot agree with, indeed I am appalled by, the Court's
suggestion that the decision whether to stand by an erroneous constitutional
decision must be strongly influenced-against overruling, no less-by the
3 09
substantial and continuing public opposition the decision has generated.
Ultimately, the Court is quite right to describe acceptance by the citizenry
as an important value. But the perceived legitimacy of the Court's actions
should be understood as an effect, not an objective. When the Court makes
reasoned decisions backed up by rational explanations, 30it must have faith that
304. Id.
305. Id. at 866.
306. Id. at 866-67. Contra id at 958-59 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in
part and dissenting in part). Chief Justice Rehnquist noted:
The first difficulty with this principle lies in its assumption that cases that are
"intensely divisive" can be readily distinguished from those that are not. The
question of whether a particular issue is "intensely divisive" enough to qualify' for
special protection is entirely subjective and dependent on the individual
assumptions of the Members of this Court.
Id
307. Id. at 867 (majority opinion).
308. Id at 997-98 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
309. Id. at 998.
310. Cf Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 266 (1986) ("While stare decisis is not an
inexorable command, the careful observer will discern that any detours from the straight path of
stare decisis in our past have occurred for articulablereasons... ." (emphasis added)); Nelson,
supra note 29, at 69. Professor Nelson notes:
[Tihe legitimacy argument is premised on the idea that the Court cannot adequately
explain why it considers a particular precedent erroneous. If the Court could
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the citizenry will accept those decisions even where widespread disagreement
exists. That faith in the citizenry is an essential component of the rule of law in
a democracy. Thus, when the Court is deciding whether to uphold a precedent,
the perceived legitimacy of its actions should be inapposite to the evaluation
process .3 1 ' The Court should focus instead on the considerations described
above: It should weigh the effects of upholding a flawed precedent against the
reliance implications of reversing course. By pushing aside political concerns
in order to focus on its proper, and limited, judicial role, the Court will foster
the very legitimacy it has properly described as integral. 1
E. A Word on Additional Stare Decisis Values
This Article has focused on the reliance implications of stare decisis
because those implications are what should drive the doctrine in its application
to specific cases. That does not mean, however, that stare decisis serves no
values other than reliance.
Perhaps most notably, stare decisis promotes predictability and the rule of
law by making the legal backdrop relatively stable-at very least, more stable
than it would be if the doctrine did not exist. Stare decisis also carries benefits
in terms of institutional stability and efficiency. To borrow Cardozo's famous

demonstrate that the precedent misinterpreted the provision it purported to
construe, then the Justices who voted to overrule the precedent would not be
jeopardizing the Court's legitimacy; instead of accusing them of imposing their
personal preferences on the country, people would understand that they were
following the law (correctly understood).
Id.; see also Monaghan, supranote 38, at 763 ("[I~f institutional self-protection is to play some
significant role in legitimation theoy... [tjhe general belief has been that decisions on the
merits are not to be avoided simply because in the long run the Court would be better off if it
could wash its hands of the controversy.").
311. See, e.g., Paulsen, supra note 136, at 1565 ("T'he judiciary has no power to enhance
public perceptions of its integrity by adopting rules of decision at variance with the
Constitution, treaties, and laws of the United States." (emphasis omnitted)).
312. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 963 (1992) (Rehnquist,
C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) ("The Judicial Branch derives its
legitimacy ...from deciding by its best lights whether legislative enactments of the popular
branches of Government comport with the Constitution. The doctrine of stare decisis...
should be no more subject to the vagaries of public opinion than is the basic judicial task.");
Farber,supra note 4, at 1197 ("Understandably, individual Justices may be troubled by the
perception that they are acting in response to political pressure .... The proper response,
however, is for those Justices to consider the merits of the case with particular cae ... and then
to explain their reasoning with clarity to the public.").
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phrase, the work of courts could be "increased almost to the breaking point if
13
every past decision could be reopened in every case."0
These values serve as additional reasons why stare decisis is meaningful
in the aggregate, across cases. The fact that the Supreme Court chooses to
overrule any single opinion will not cast the rule of law into serious doubt. But
if the Court were to overrule fifty opinions in the course of a single Term,
things might be different. 1 Similarly, the Court's institutional efficiency is
served by the very existence of stare decisis. That is what saves the Court
from, for example, having to revisit the incorporation debate in every challenge
to a state law that arguably violates some guarantee of the Bill of Rights. 1
My focus on reliance interests should not be viewed as minimizing the
importance of these values. It simply reflects the fact that, significant though
they may be as overarching concepts, the values lack predictive force within the
context of a given case-meaning they provide little help in fashioning a
functional doctrine of stare decisis.
V. Conclusion: Stare Decisis and Reliance
The foregoing analysis leaves us with two guiding principles for
rethinking stare decisis.
First, the Supreme Court should avoid most of the considerations that
currently dominate its discussions of stare decisis. At best, those
considerations serve as imperfect proxies for reliance interests that are more
fruitful to talk about directly; at worst, the considerations are indeterminate
distractions.
Second, to frame its inquiry into reliance, the Court should proceed
through four categories of relevant interests: specific reliance, governmental
reliance, doctrinal reliance, and societal reliance. The Court should work
313.

CARDozo. supra note 4. at 149; see also Fallon,supra note 27. at 573 ("LA]mong the

greatest effects of stare decisis is to justify the Court in treating some questions as settled ....
The doctrine liberates the Justices from what otherwise would be a constitutional obligation to
reconsider every potential disputable issue as if it were being raised for the first time .....

(footnote omitted)).
314. Cf Fallon, supra note 6, at 1156 ("[T]he Justices feel constrained from overturning
too many past decisions-however loose the notion of 'too many' might be-by an
apprehension that the public would find too much instability in constitutional law to be
unacceptable." (footnote omnitted)).
315. Supra Part IV.C; Farber, supra note 4, at 1177 ("Imagine if, in every First
Amendment case, the lawyers had to reargue basic questions such as whether the First
Amendment applies to the states or whether it covers nonpolitical speech (both of which have
been debated by scholars).").
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through these categories systematically to decide which ones are implicated in a
given case. It should then delve into the relevant reliance interests, avoiding
abstraction and focusing instead on being as rigorous as possible in its analysis.
That entails asking questions such as how many stakeholders would be affected
by the overruling of a given precedent; how severely they would suffer; how
much legislative and judicial work would need to be redone; and whether
widely held understandings about fundamental legal norms might be shaken.
This is, it must be conceded, easier said than done. So, too, is answering
the final question that arises once the reliance assessment is complete: Does
the importance of reaching the correct result on the merits outweigh the basket
of aggregated reliance interests that would be upset? These are difficult,
slippery, and intimidating inquiries. Stare decisis, like multitudes of other
doctrines, will always remain part art and part science. We should not expect it
to become the stuff of algorithm. 1
Over time, though, a doctrine of stare decisis revamped along the lines
suggested here has the potential to develop into something far more coherent,
predictable, and consistent than the current version. As the Court began to
conduct rigorous analyses of reliance interests, and as attorneys tailored their
arguments to reflect the Court's practice, we would expect vast improvements
in the degree to which reliance interests are understood and accounted for. And
by clearing away the distracting litany of flawed proxies that dominate the
existing jurisprudence, the Court could position the doctrine of staredecisis to
become more and more refined through the familiar process of common-law
adjudication.3 t
Notwithstanding the serious challenges, the payoff-an enhanced doctrine
of stare decisis that delivers on the fundamental values it is designed to
promote-is well worth it. The initial step toward a solution is straightforward.
It is simply to recognize that the doctrine has veered off course, and that the
jurisprudence should be reconstituted around rigorous examination of the
critical reliance interests at the core of stare decisis.

316. See, e.g., CAiDozo, supra note 4, at 160 ("Somewhere between worship of the past
and exaltation of the present, the path of safety will be found."); Fisch, supra note 5, at 108
("The Court is being asked to weigh competing yet incommensurate values-te value of an
identified legal improvement against the process values sacrificed by overruling.").
317. See Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 408 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) ("[Tlhe process of trial and error, so fr-uitful in the physical sciences, is appropriate
also in the judicial function.").

